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NOTES
Contracts-Meeting of the Minds and U.C.C. § 2-204
In a recent Illinois decision, Euclid Engineering Corporation v.
Illinois Power Company,1 the court had to determine the extent to
which the liberal approach of the Uniform Commercial Code to-
ward contract law would be applied in the formation of a contract.
Defendant wrote plaintiff a letter inviting offers on certain generator
units "subject to our acceptance of purchaser's assurance that the
units will be used outside of the Illinois area." Following a tele-
phone conversation between the parties, plaintiff offered by letter
to pay 30,000 dollars for the units "subject our inspection and ap-
proval." Defendant accepted the offer by letter and, had no further
correspondence ensued, plaintiff would have proved the existence of
a contract. But plaintiff then mailed a check for the amount with a
letter stating, "It is regrettable that our negotiations for the pur-
chase of the equipment should result in controversy regarding our
ultimate disposition for re-sale," and clarifying its intention to be
free in disposing of the units throughout the United States except
for the Illinois area.
On the basis of section 2-204' of the Code plaintiff argued that
the correspondence between the parties constituted a valid contract.
The existence of a contract under that section became the decisive
issue on appeal. It appears that this court faced the dilemma of hav-
ing not only to do justice between the parties but also to promote uni-
1 79 1I1 App. 2d 145, 223 N.E.2d 409 (1967).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(1): "This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
[Hereinafter cited as Code; textual section references are to the Code unless
otherwise indicated.]
'Code § 2-204: Formation in General
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of such a contract.(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a con-
tract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
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formity under the Code.' The court disposed of the case by en-
grafting upon section 2-204 the theory of a meeting of the minds'
to find that there was no contract when all of the correspondence was
construed together.
The necessity of finding a meeting of the minds or mutual assent
as an indispensable element of a contract' is justified by the unfair-
ness of holding one to an agreement to which he did not assent.7
Therefore the attention of the court traditionally focused upon the
nature of "assent" and induced analyses in terms of subjective and
objective theories of contractual liability. The hypothetical basis
of the subjective theory is that the measure of agreement depends
upon actual mental assent, that is, whether both of the parties men-
tally determined and intended to enter into the same contract.' The
obvious disadvantage of such an approach is that "the devil himself
knoweth not the thought of man."' However, the parties should be
able to rely on representation rather than speculation in transacting
business. It is equally necessary for the court to be able to rely upon
something less elusive than thoughts to render justice in a particular
situation. Since the subjective mental state is determinable only by
permitting one to say what it was, perjury and a large element of self
interest are encouraged, further discrediting the subjective theory.10
To minimize the foregoing difficulties 1 courts generally have adopted
the objective theory that manifested intent is supreme,' 2 not to be
'See Code Introductory Comment; Holahan, Contract Formalities and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 VILL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1952).
' "The Uniform Commercial Code has not made any change in the basic
law." 79 Ill. App. 2d at 152, 223 N.E.2d at 413.
'G. GRIsMoRE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11, § 49 (rev.
ed. J. Murray 1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932); L. SIMPSON,
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9 (2d ed. 1965).
"See O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967);
Topeka Say. Ass'n v. Beck, 199 Kan. 272, 428 P.2d 779 (1967); Peters v.
Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 152 N.W.2d 103 (1967); Richardson v. Greensboro
Whse. & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897 (1943); Dodds v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 205 N.C. 153, 170 S.E. 652 (1933).
'See G. GRIsmoRE, supra note 6, § 12.
Y.B. Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, 2 (1462).
10 Phelps, The Nature of Mutual Assent in Contracts, 10 OKLA. L. REv.
410, 411 (1957).
1Id.1
-RESTATEMENT OF CO NTRACTS § 20 (1932): A manifestation of mutual
assent by the parties to an informal contract is essential to its formation
and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be done with the
intent to do these acts; but ... neither mental assent to the promises in
the contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally
binding is essential.
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"frustrated or altered by the secrets and undisclosed intent of one
of the parties to the contrary."' 8 The subjective theory, however, is
likely to remain an undercurrent in decisions' 4 because not all prob-
lems will be solvable through the objective approach. 5
In typical business transactions the buyer and seller enter into
many sales based on their knowledge of good business practice, cus-
tom, usage and perhaps commercial law, but generally they do not
contemplate the legal consequences of each action. Problems of con-
tract formation arise, nevertheless, where human discord or, more
frequently, changing market conditions effect a change in one's in-
tention to have a contract. 6 Rather than adhering to the traditional
analyses of contract formation in such a situation, the Code approach
in section 2-204
dispense[s] not only with formalities in contracting, but also with
the necessity of finding an exact time when the contract for sale
was made ... and with exactness or definiteness of "one or more
terms" of the contract .... In these respects its purpose is ap-
parently to empower or require courts to give legal consequences
to the rough-hewn deals of business men, even though they lack
the precision which the judicial mind would find indispens-
able .... 17
Section 2-204(1) provides for a contract involving the sale of
goods to be made in any manner showing agreement, including con-
duct by the parties recognizing that a contract exists. Its purpose
was to permit the court to treat "informal dealings as creating bind-
"Rodgers, McCabe, & Co. v. Bell, 156 N.C. 378, 382, 72 S.E. 817, 818
(1911); see White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467 (Ct. App. 1871) ("unevinced
mental determination" without legal effect).
' It has been said of the subjective theory that "it must necessarily be
reckoned with even today, whatever the avowed theory may be. Moreover
it is only by keeping constantly in mind the possibility of a conflict of theory
... that one can hope to understand and to harmonize decisions .
G. GRIsmfoRuE, supra note 6, § 12.
" In Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325
F.2d 2, 18 (3d Cir. 1963) appellee's representative testified that he thought
his automobile financing was being handled by a company other than appellant,
although the objective manifestations of appellee indicated that the contract
under examination was with appellant. Held, "[R]egardless of appellant's
objective manifestations . . . [appellee] never intended to accept appellant's
offer, if any, and that his conduct never reflected the recognition of a financ-
ing contract's existence ......
"046 CORNELL L.Q. 308, 310 (1961).
' REPORT OF THE NEw YORK LAW REv. COMM'N FOR 1955: STUDY OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (I) at 268 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as 1955 REPORT].
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ing obligations."'" No basic change was made in prior law' 9 except
to the extent that recognition of a contract by the parties creates a
test, unknown at common law,20 by which a contract may be found
when there is a bargain in fact.2 Subsection (1) is probably of
little practical importance in view of the reliance by courts upon
similar language in section 2-207(3) .22
Section 2-204(2) initiates the principle that the precise moment
when a contract is made may be unknown without vitiating liability.
Its aim was to facilitate the formation of contracts by correspon-
dence,s but the Code does not say that the court cannot find a calen-
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204, N.C. Comment (1965).
"o Code § 2-204, Comment; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204, N.C. Comment
(1965); 1955 REPORT 269; see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1932):
"The manifestation of mutual assent may be made wholly or partly by written
or spoken words or by other acts or conduct."
20 1955 REPORT 271-273.
1 In Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co.,
355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1965), the court relied upon the "liberal policy regard-
ing formation of contracts of sale" of section 2-204(1) to find a contract in
a course of dealing between the parties.
" See 1955 REPORT 271-273. Compare Code § 1-201(11):
"Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from the
parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of
law. (Compare "Agreement.")
with Code § 1-201(3):
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided
in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable;
otherwise by the law of contracts (Section 1-103). (Compare "Con-
tract.")
One reason that it has not been necessary for the court to use § 2-204(1)
in a situation represented by Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216
N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (Ct. App. 1915) should be noted. There, following
plaintiffs offer, defendant made a "counter-offer" by making acceptance of
plaintiff's offer contingent on a prompt acknowledgment by plaintiff. Held,
no contract because plaintiff never acknowledged receipt of the offer. Today
the court seems to rely upon Code § 2-207 to find a contract in a Poel situa-
tion. In re Doughboy Industries, 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488
(1962); cf. Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (Ct. App.
1954) (liberal decision, much criticized, antedating Code in New York). Buet
see Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
Arguably Code § 2-204(1) is an equally valid ground for finding the
existence of a contract in a factual setting of the Poel type. However, section
2-207 has permitted courts to disregard material differences between offer
and acceptance and to overlook or incorporate additional terms in acceptance
in construing the terms of a contract. See generally 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 477
(1962). But section 2-207 is of limited utility in determining wzhen a contract
exists.
3 Code § 2-204, Comment.
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dar date for the commencement of a contract where necessary be-
cause of a statute of limitations.24
Section 2-204(3) states that even if certain terms are left "open"
a contract will not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intend to
make a contract and a reasonably certain basis exists for a remedy.
Contracts with open terms are intentionally approved,2 5 reflecting
their practical utility, but two pre-requisites must be met. The
first-that the parties intended to make a contract-restricts the
operation of the principle if it must be shown that the parties in-
tended to assume a binding legal obligation in the course of informal
agreements.20 Proof requirements are less stringent, however, if an
intent to enter into a "bargain in fact" is sufficient. In determining
whether parties have intended to make a contract the courts, as in
Euclid, are likely to adhere to the salient policy of examining the
whole correspondence between the parties to ascertain whether the
latest expressed intent was to have a contract.2" The second pre-
requisite to an open terms contract is the existence of a "reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."2 9 Neither certainty
concerning the performance contemplated nor exactitude concerning
the amount of damages is required.3 Subsection (3) seems to
change prior law to some extent8' for reports are laden with cases
stating that minds must meet as to all terms of a contract."2 The ex-
" See 1955 REPORT 269-271.
"Code § 2-204, Comment.
"1955 REPORT 279.
" This conflict between technical language ("contract") and a liberal
policy may have been created deliberately to enable courts to "do justice"
in each case. The difference in results will probably depend upon the extent
to which the courts choose to overlook differences in terms of acceptance,
Code § 2-207, or to disregard omissions. See Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch. 453, 463, 166 A.2d 726, 732 (1960) where it was
said that "those drafting the statute intended that the omission of even
an important term does not prevent the finding under the statute that the
parties intended to make a contract."
"'Elks v. North State Life Ins. Co., 159 N.C. 619, 75 S.E. 808 (1912);
Bristol, Cardiff, & Swansea AErated Bread Co. v. Maggs, 44 Ch. Div. 616(1890).
" Code § 2-204(3). It appears from the two reported cases concerning
this subject that subsection (3) applies to a transfer of shares of stock, Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 458, 200 A.2d 441 (1964), and
includes situations wherein a contract may not be "sufficiently definite to be
specifically enforced yet which, upon breach, justifies the granting of dam-
ages," Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch. 453, 465, 166
A.2d 726, 733 (1960).
"Code § 2-204, Comment.
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204, N.C. Comment (1965), and cases
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tent to which prior law is changed depends upon the number of ex-
ceptions which the particular jurisdiction has made to this stricter
rule.3" How indefinite a contract is permitted to be depends upon
commercial standards, but the greater the number of "open" terms
the less likely a contract will be found,84 unless conduct is decisive
under section 2-204(1) or section 2-207(3).
The general tenor of the Code is, in summary, that ordinary and
technical contract rules should not govern sales contracts unless
they can further principles "unique to the commercial world.""8
But the court in Euclid relied upon the older common law principles
in approaching contract formation instead of finding clear and fixed
authority within the Code itself.3" The court seems to have violated
Code policy by not finding contractual liability where conduct clearly
indicated contractual intent in terms of Code law. The Code formu-
lation of mutual assent has received scant attention. This may be be-
cause section 2-204 has not been thought needed when section
2-207 7 and basic contract principles 38 are available; it may also be
because counsel have not recognized that section 2-204 makes subtle
variations in common law concepts of mutual assent which may be
used to advantage. Yet these concepts and their variations should be
recognized and implemented within the Code structure to produce a
more complete and reliable body of Code law, thereby facilitating
business transactions. 9 Within the breadth of section 2-204 social
justice in terms of business relationships is readily accessible with-
cited therein; 1955 REPORT 279. Cf. Weilersbacher v. Pittsburgh Brewing
Co., 421 Pa. 118, 121, 218 A.2d 806, 808 (1966) where an oral agreement
was held valid with reliance upon section 2-204(3).2 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Corporate Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1967).
" North Carolina, for example, has enforced "output" and "requirements"
contracts and has supplied terms in contracts otherwise proper for a "place
of delivery" and a "time for performance." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-204,
N.C. Comment (1965), and cases cited therein.
'Code § 2-204, Comment.
85 Charney, How to Make a Contract Under the U. C. C., 16 BROOKLYN
BAR. 18, 27 (1964).80See 13 U. Pirr. L. REv. 750 (1952).
Note 21 supra.
, Code § 1-103.
"'See Code § 1-102(2): "Underlying purposes and policies of this Act
are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions."
[Vol. 46
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out unreservedly engrafting upon the Code such concepts as will




The North Carolina Supreme Court recently reconsidered its
position regarding privileged confidential communications between
husband and wife.1 In Hicks v. Hicks,' the wife had instituted a
suit under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967),'
for the custody of their eight-year-old daughter, for maintenance
and support for her and the child, and for counsel fees. The trial
record reveals that the husband had installed a tape recorder in the
basement of the home. There was no evidence that the wife knew
of the tape recorder. On three different occasions, in the presence of
their eight-year-old child, conversations between the husband and
wife were recorded. The opinion does not disclose what was said on
"See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 206 (1917):
The legal relations consequent upon offer and acceptance are not wholly
dependent, even upon the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of
the parties. The law determines these relations in the light of subsequent
circumstances, these often being totally unforeseen by the parties. In
such cases it is sometimes said that the law will create that relation which
the parties would have intended had they foreseen. The fact is, however,
that the decision will depend upon the notions of the court as to policy,
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions being inarticulate and
subconscious.
1 Common law developed four distinct rules regarding testimony between
husband and wife. These rules have not always been kept separate in legal
writings. These four categories are: (1) one spouse could not testify in
the other's behalf (2) one spouse could not testify against the other (3) one
spouse could not testify about confidential communications with the other(4) neither spouse could testify to nonaccess so as to basterdize a child
conceived or born during the marriage. See generally J. MAGUiRE, EVIDENCE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 78-101 (1947); D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 53-61 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANs-
nURY]; 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285-87, 2332-41 (McNaughton rev.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] ; Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and
Incompetencies of Hitsband and Wife, 4 ARK. L. REv. 426 (1950).
271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967).3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967) provides for alimony without
divorce and for custody of any children of the marriage. This section con-
cerns support and not divorce. Shore v. Shore, 220 N.C. 802, 18 S.E.2d 353
(1942).
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
these occasions, but did indicate that the wife "used vile and profane
language in respect to her husband."4 The trial judge remarked to
the jury "'there was a pretty ugly conversation in the presence of
that little girl.' "5 On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether the recordings were admissible in
evidence. The court held the recordings inadmissible due to the
privileged communications rule and ordered a new trial.
The court was faced initially with the admissibility of the sound
recording itself.' The great weight of authority,' which the court
followed,' holds that evidence offered in the form of a sound re-
cording is not inadmissible because of that form, if properly authen-
ticated9 and if not excluded by some positive rule of law because
of the subject matter. As early as 1936, a Pennsylvania court per-
ceived that the phonograph, the dictaphone, the talking motion pic-
ture, and other recording devices were in such common use that the
verity of their recording and reproduction of sounds was well estab-
lished. Thus, the court could permit their use as a means of present-
ing evidentiary facts to the jury.'0
' 271 N.C. 204, 206, 155 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1967).
rId. at 207, 155 S.E.2d at 802.
'See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958).
7Id. at 1029-30.
8271 N.C. 204, 205, 155 S.E.2d 799, 800 (1967).
Sound recordings have almost universal approval as an acceptable form
of evidence; this is premised upon a proper foundation initially established
for their admission. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024, 1032-36 (1958). See, e.g.,
Williams v. State, 226 P.2d 989 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951), which lays down
seven requirements for a proper foundation.
.. Commonwealth v. Clark. 123 Pa. Super. 277, 187 A. 237 (1936). As
to the use of recordings containing privileged communications between
spouses, see Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (in a
divorce proceeding it was error to admit into evidence a wire recording of con-
versations between spouses since confidential communications between spouses
cannot be divulged by either spouse without the consent of the other). Ac-
cord, People v. Buckowski, 37 Cal. 2d 629, 233 P.2d 912 (1951); Braun v.
Braun, 31 Wash. 2d 468, 197 P.2d 442 (1948). B.tt see State v. Slater, 36
Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950) (a criminal case where the admission
in evidence of a wire recording of a confidential communication between
spouses, simultaneously overheard by a third person, a police officer, was ap-
parently upheld on the ground that an eavesdropper is unaffected by the rule
of privilege. In earlier North Carolina cases tape recordings and television
recordings were allowed in evidence). State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112
S.E.2d 61 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960) (a criminal conspiracy
case in which a tape recording was offered in evidence in corroboration of
the witness who had testified regarding those matters on the tape); State
v. Knight, 261 N.C. 17, 134 S.E.2d 101 (1964) (recognizing admissibility of
a television recording for impeachment purposes). For information on the
[Vol. 46
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The court then concerned itself with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56
(Supp. 1967), which expressly provides: "No husband or wife shall
be compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by
one to the other during their marriage."" This statute presents
various problems when it is applied to the present fact situation.
Essentially the court must decide three issues: (1) who has the
privilege and who may waive it; (2) whether the presence of a
third person destroys the privilege even though the third person is
a child and member of the family; and (3) whether the presence of
the third person destroys the privilege in toto so that either spouse
may testify or destroys it only to the extent that the third person
alone may testify.
The marital privilege of confidential communications is to be dis-
tinguished from rules disqualifying witnesses as unreliable and from
rules, e.g., the hearsay rule, excluding evidence because of lack of
trustworthiness or because of its prejudicial effect. The rule of
privilege shuts out probative evidence as a matter of policy in recog-
nition of the desirability of protecting certain human relationships,
even at the expense of the judicial investigation of truth. 2 The
social gain to be fostered is absolute confidence between spouses.
use of motion pictures, see Annot., 129 A.L.R. 361 (1940); Annot., 83 A.L.R.
1351 (1933).
" A partial bibliography of materials treating privileged communications
between husband and wife follows: STANSBURY § 60; R. WEINBERG, CONFI-
DENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 26-30 (1967); WIG-
MORE §§ 2332-41; Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 ORE.
L. PEv. 132 (1957); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Ttn. L. REv. 101 (1956); McCor-
mick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. ZEv. 447
(1938); Platz, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin? Various Privileges, 1945
WlTs. L. Rav. 239; Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
26 U. CIN. L. REv. 537, 550 (1957); Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of
Evidence-Confidential Communications Between Spouses, 5 OXLA. L. REv.
291, 311 (1952); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and Incompetencies of
Husband and Wife, 4 Ajx. L. REV. 426, 429-32 (1950) ; Note, Spousal Testi-
mnony, 28 BROOLYN L. REV. 259, 279-84 (1962); Note, Privileged Comnund-
cations Between Husband andT Wife in the District of Columnbia, 1 CATH.
U.L. REV. 9 (1950); Note, Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indi-
ana, 27 IND. L.J. 256 (1952); Note, Marital Evidentiary Privilege in
Minnesota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1952); Note, Evidence-Privileged
Communications Between Husband and Wife, 15 N.C.L. Rlv. 282 (1937);
Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent Developments, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 590, 593 (1952); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929). This most modem
and widely recognized marital privilege has the sanction of statute in more
than forty jurisdictions. The statutes have been collected in 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
'2 WIGMORE § 2285.
1968]
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The policy of the privilege 3 was expressed in State v. Brittain4
thusly:
The relation of husband and wife is confidential, from unity of in-
terest and sometimes unity of person, as in a case of joint estate
to them. The law requires and exhorts this confidence, and
it will protect it. Communications between them cannot be ex-
posed to public view. The interest of the home, the parties, the
children and especially the peace and order of society forbid it.1
The privilege embraces oral and written communications'0 but not
ordinarily acts.'1 It is applicable to a marital status only, i.e., com-
munications "during marriage."' Therefore, the privilege does not
apply to a communication between spouses living in separation, " or
between persons living in unlawful cohabitation, 20 since the relation is
not one in which the law wishes to foster confidence. The privilege
does not protect communications between man and woman before their
marriage," but once the privilege has arisen, it remains after termina-
tion of the marital relation by death 22 or divorce23 as to communica-
tions during marriage.
There is a split of authority among the states regarding which
spouse has the privilege and who may waive it.' Some courts feel
" WIGMORE § 2332; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MNmN. L. IEv. 675, 680-82
(1929).
1 117 N.C. 783, 23 S.E. 433 (1895).
19Id. at 795, 23 S.E. at 433.
"Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154 (1898) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell,
80 Tex. 101, 15 S.W. 705 (1891).
" WIGMORE § 2337 (acts may be communicative in nature so some acts
may be covered by the privilege).
1 Whitford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 233, 79 S.E. 501
(1913) held that a letter written by husband and received by wife after his
death not privileged, since communication was not made during marriage.
1" Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469, 87 A. 40 (1913); Contra,
People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1959).
Oyola held privilege applicable where separation was short and communica-
tion was in nature of an attempted reconciliation.
" People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (1958) (privilege
does not apply where marriage is bigamous).
"United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Halbock v.
Hill, 261 F. 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1919); Forshay v. Johnston, 144 Neb. 525, 13
N.W.2d 873 (1944); Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 14 S.W.2d 720 (1929).
" See WiGmoRE § 2341 n.1 for numerous cases on this point.
- Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960); Pereira v. U.S.,
202 F.2d 830, 834 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 570, 579 (1954) ; But
see, Coles v. Harsch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 P. 248 (1929).
2 WIGMOIE § 2340.
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that since the privilege is intended to secure freedom from appre-
hension in the mind of the communicator, he has the privilege, and
the addressee cannot object, unless the latter's silence is viewed as
an assent and adoption of the statement as his own.25 Under this
reasoning the communicating spouse alone has the privilege and he
alone may waive it.2 However, the general rule which existed at
common law is that communications made by one spouse to the
other in confidence of the marital relation are so protected that
neither spouse can disclose or can be required to disclose unless the
other spouse consents thereto and waives the privilege.2 7 Thus both
spouses have the privilege but neither can waive it without the con-
sent of the other.
The court in Hicks in considering the scope and meaning of this
privilege discovered what must be viewed as an aberration in North
Carolina law regarding who may claim the privilege and who may
waive it. In Hagedorn v. Hagedorn" the court permitted the wife
to testify to confidential conversations with her husband, over the
husband's objection.29 "Thus," one commentator has summarized,
"under this decision [the Hagedorn case] where one spouse con-
fides in the other, apparently both spouses are given a privilege not to
disclose the confidence, but either can waive it for both.""0 Until
the present case the North Carolina Supreme Court had no oppor-
tunity to reconsider this position, with the exception of an obiter
dictum in accord with the decision of the Hagedorn case." The
common law rule, i.e., that both spouses have the privilege and
neither can waive it without the consent of the other, is a direct con-
tradiction of the rule in Hagedorn. North Carolina recognized the
common law formulation of the privilege before it was written into
" WIGMAORE §§ 2338 par. (4), 2340. E.g., Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211
N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937); Contra, Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super.
498, 503, 83 A.2d 401, 403 (1951), note 10 supra.
" State v. Branch, 193 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 801 (1927).
"Note 24 supra; State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929);
State v. McKinney, 175 N.C. 784, 95 S.E. 162 (1918); State v. Randall,
170 N.C. 757, 87 S.E. 227 (1915) ; State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 623, 78 S.E. 1
(1913); Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57 (1891).
.211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937).
STANSEURY § 60.
15 N.C.L. REv. 382, 285 (1937). This excellent note criticizes the
Hagedorn case stating that "In arriving at this result, the Court relied
solely upon one North Carolina case, [Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N.C. 465, 149
S.E. 585 (1929)] which is not in point, and a dictum of the Supreme Court
of the United States [Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U.S. 227, 236 (1899)]."
" Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 16, 116 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1960).
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the present statute. 2 In McCoy v. Justice,33 for example, a letter
written by the husband to the wife was held inadmissible without the
husband's consent even though the wife betrayed the confidence by
giving the letter to a third person. Note that the privilege did not
terminate when the third person received the letter.
If the court in Hicks had followed the Hagedorn decision, the
husband could have waived the privilege. The court did not expressly
overrule Hagedorn or the obiter dictum in accord, but simply held if
they were applicable to the facts then the court was inclined not to
follow them.3 The court apparently adopted the common law rule in
interpreting the statute but it is distressing that the court did not
expressly overrule the Hagedorn case which is a clear departure from
the statute.
The final issue in the case, i.e., whether the presence of a third
person, a child, during the conversations removed the veil of confi-
dence, had to be determined by the court. The essence of the privi-
lege is to protect confidential communications only.,5 The better
view appears to be that all marital communications are presumed con-
fidential, but it is a rebuttable presumption." According to the
reasoning of most courts, this confidentiality is destroyed when the
communication is made in the known presence of a third person.8 7
Also, since the privilege insures the communicating spouse only that
his confidences will not be disclosed without his consent in court by
" In State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. 108 (1838) the court said: "whatever is
known by reason of that intimacy [marriage] should be regarded as knowl-
edge confidentially acquired, and that neither [husband nor wife] should be
allowed to divulge it to the danger and disgrace of the other." Id. at 112.
199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452 (1930). See also, State v. Banks, 204 N.C.
233, 167 S.E. 851 (1933) where the court refused to allow cross-examination
of witness as to contents of letter written by him to his wife and delivered
by her to counsel to show bias. The contrary implication in State v. Branch,
193 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 801 (1927) would appear to be an inadvertance.
" 271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
"Wigmore suggests that all marital communications should be presumed
confidential until the contrary is shown. WIGMORE § 2336. See also, Sexton
v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314 (1905); Comment, 4 ARK. L. REv.
426, 430 (1950).
" Id. Accord, R. WEINBERG, CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS 28 (1967).
"' WIGMORE § 2339. See also, Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57(1891). Some cases have held that communications between spouses, al-
though made in the presence of a third person, are privileged. E.g., Mahl-
stedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Ili. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915). Some states
follow this rule on the ground that the disqualifying statute makes no ex-




the addressee,"8 an eavesdropper, unknown to the spouses, who over-
hears them, is not prohibited from making a disclosure.39 Conse-
quently, according to the great weight of authority, a communica-
tion, conversation, or transaction between husband and wife in the
presence of or overheard by a third person is not within the pro-
tection of the privileged communications rule.4" The majority
of courts allow the third person to testify, but courts disagree
whether the addressee may also testify. The logical rule would
appear to be that a communication made by one spouse to the
other in the known presence of a third person would not be
considered confidential and could be the subject of testimony by
the spouse to whom the communication is made; but that a com-
munication made by one spouse to the other in supposed privacy,
which is overheard by an eavesdropper would still be a confidential
communication and the addresse could not testify as to the communi-
cation. Yet the majority of jurisdictions do not seem to require that
the presence of a third person be known to the communicator in order
to render the testimony of a spouse regarding the communication ad-
missible. 1 "But," it has been noted, "the facts of the majority of
"8 Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 37 (1920); Commonwealth v.
Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918).
" State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950), supra note 10;
Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918) (homicide;
conversation between husband and wife in jail, overheard by dictograph, ad-
mitted); Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S.W. 460 (1906);
State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (1862) (conversation overheard by witness who
was in the next room).
' WIGMOR § 2339. E.g., Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934);
Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913); Cowser v. State,
157 S.W. 758 (Tex. 1913). North Carolina has several cases speaking
to this point. State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929) is an arson
prosecution in which a third person was permitted to testify what he heard
husband tell wife at time of arrest. In State v. McKinney, 175 N.C. 784,
95 S.E. 162 (1918) a constable was allowed to testify that at the time of
arrest the wife told the defendant husband she had warned him against selling
whiskey and that he would get caught. State v. Randall, 170 N.C. 757, 87
S.E. 227 (1915) was a liquor offense in which conversations overheard
by a police officer were admitted. In State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. 1
(1913) eavesdropper unknown to spouses was allowed to testify to the con-
versation. In Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57 (1891) a third person
was allowed to testify about what the husband said to the wife to show
adulterous intercourse as well as contradicting a previous witness. C.f.
State v. Brittain, 117 N.C. 783, 23 S.E. 433 (1895) where the wife was
forced by her husband to confess to him about incest, then forced by him to
confess to her mother; since the first confession was inadmissible, the second
confession was also excluded as stemming or proceeding from the first.
" Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 116 (1929).
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
these cases show that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
them is that the presence of a third person was known to the hus-
band and wife.""
Members of one's family occupy the same position as strangers
in that their knowledge of a communication between spouses affects
the privilege of that communication. 43 Thus, if a communication is
made in the known presence of a member of the family,44 or is over-
heard by a member of the family,45 the veil of confidence has been
removed and the communication is not privileged.
In Hicks, a third person was present during the conversations,
but that person was a child. Does the presence of a child remove the
veil of confidence so that the husband could submit the recordings
in evidence? The answer to this question logically should involve
two additional problems: (1) evaluation of the competency of the
child to determine whether she may or may not be considered a
third person within the rule, and (2) if the child is determined com-
petent, whether the privilege is completely destroyed so that one of
the spouses may submit evidence concerning the conversations or is
destroyed only to the extent that the child could testify. Unfortu-
nately the court did not face either of these problems; it simply gave
its conclusions without any reasons. The court stated that it con-
strued the statute broadly and held that the husband and wife in-
tended their utterances to be privileged and that the "presence of
the eight-year-old daughter did not destroy the veil of confidence
thrown over these confidential conversations .... '4' Thus the court
held the tape recordings inadmissible and ordered a new trial.
Three problems faced the court and no satisfactory answer was
given to any of them. First, the court should have made its position
regarding the Hagedorn case explicit rather than saying it does not
apply to these facts. But the court did indicate that the other de-
421 Id.
'3 Id. at 118.
"In Taylor v. Winsted, 74 Ind. App. 511, 129 N.E. 259 (1920) a wife
was held competent to testify to statements made by her to her husband in
the presence of their sixteen-year-old daughter. Cowser v. State, 157 S.W.
758 (Tex. 1913) held that a wife may testify as to a conversation between
herself and her husband in the presence of her daughter.
' Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51, 143 N.E. 813 (1924) held that when a
daughter was in a room 10 or 12 feet from room where wife made angry
statements to husband, the husband should be allowed to testify.
" 271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
[Vol. 46
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
cisions since 18 38"' are uniform and that it would follow them.
The logical conclusion is that the rule in North Carolina is that both
spouses have the privilege but neither can waive it without the con-
sent of the other. Secondly, the court should have concerned itself
with the competency of the child. In North Carolina there is no fixed
limit below which a witness is incompetent to testify, but the witness
must understand the obligation of the oath and have sufficient intelli-
gence to give evidence."' North Carolina is liberal in allowing chil-
dren to testify; several cases have found children under seven years
old competent to testify.49 Previously courts have made the follow-
ing inquiries: Was the child of sufficient intelligence to pay attention
to, and to understand, what was being said? ° Was the child in-
terested in what was being said?51 Did the child pay attention to
or take any part in the conversation ?2 In the principal case the court
failed to make any such inquiries; however, the court stated at one
point in its discussion that the child was "'singing or playing in the
area' 3 during one of the conversations, thus possibly implying that
the child was not paying attention to or was not interested in what
was being said. The court made no further observations about the
child in respect to the other two conversations and nowhere referred
to the child's competancy. If the child was determined competent
as a third person, how could the spouses intend their conversations
to be confidential when making vile and profane statements in
" State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. 108 (1838).
48 STANSBURY § 55.
,McCurdy v. Ashley, 259 N.C. 619, 131 S.E.2d 321 (1963) (six-year-old
boy allowed to testify to events occurring nearly two years earlier) ; State
v. Gibson, 221 N.C. 252, 20 S.E. 51 (1942) (admitting testimony of five-year-
old, rejecting that of six-year-old, not abuse of discretion) ; See also, State
v. Harrington, 260 N.C. 663, 133 S.E.2d 452 (1963); Artesani v. Gritton,
252 N.C. 463, 113 S.E.2d 895 (1960); State v. Edwards, 79 N.C. 648
(1878).
'0 Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925) (thirteen-year-
old daughter held capable of comprehending what was said); Freeman v.
Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 130 N.E. 220 (1921) (nine-year-old child held not
of sufficient intelligence to comprehend conversation) ; Schierstein v. Schier-
stein, 68 Mo. App. 205 (1896) (infant child held incapable of comprehend-
ing).
gLyon v. Prouty, 154 Mass. 488, 28 N.E. 908 (1891) held that a four-
teen-year-old daughter would be interested when conversations concerned
seduction.
" Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897) held that the wife could not
testify as to a private conversation where the thirteen-year-old-daughter took
no part in the conversation.
271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
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the presence of the third person? Thirdly, if the court had de-
termined the child competent as a third person, the problem of
whether both the child and husband could testify would arise. The
better view appears to be that the privilege is completely destroyed
as to a conversation made in the known presence of a third person
and therefore the husband should be allowed to testify via the tape
recordings. North Carolina follows the rule that the third person
either known or unknown to the spouses may testify, but whether
the spouse may in turn testify once the actual presence of a third
person has been established has not been decided. 4
A court should be zealous in protecting the privilege of con-
fidential communications which is intended to secure the perfect
confidence and trust which should characterize the relation of hus-
band and wife. However, the privilege protects only the institution
of marriage. It seems that the court in Hicks viewed the privilege
as covering the familial unit. The fact that the spouses intend their
conversations to be private and confidential seems immaterial when
spoken in the known presence of a third person, even if that third
person is a child. The court possibly considered the child such an
integral part of the marriage that she should not be considered a
third person. The real problem with the case is the failure of the
court to articulate the reasons for its decision, resulting in consider-




Multiple-party actions in the federal courts are susceptible to dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction because of the rule of complete di-
versity requiring that no plaintiff be a citizen of a state of which a
defendant is a citizen.- The jurisdiction of the federal courts over
suits "between citizens of different states"' seemingly contradicts
the basic tenets of federalism, for these suits involve rights grounded
"' Note 40 supra.
1 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1964).
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in state law cognizable in state courts." The federal courts have been
sensitive to this contradiction and have sought to "scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the [Ju-
diciary Acts have] defined." 4 In multiple-party actions, therefore,
the courts have been obliged to ignore the arrangement of the parties
on the pleadings and to take upon themselves the duty of realigning
the parties "according to their sides in the dispute."5 The commonly
accepted test for realignment is the "real" or "ultimate" interests of
the parties.' This refers to the parties' interests at law which may or
may not coincide with their interests in fact. In the case of corpora-
tions and their shareholders, however, the courts have recognized that
common interests and a common stance on the litigation do not al-
ways follow from common interests at law. In a stockholder's deriva-
tive action the corporation will not be realigned as a party plaintiff if
the court finds that it is under control "antagonistic" to enforcement
of the claim." In this class of actions the federal courts have substi-
tuted antagonism between the parties for the pattern of legal interest
as a basis for alignment and have thereby created an exception to the
ultimate interest test.8
This exception was expanded to non-stockholder actions in the
[Diversity jurisdiction] poses the deepest issue of the uses of the federal
courts. In these instances the jurisdiction is employed not to vindicate
rights grounded in the national authority but solely to administer state
law. . . . The problem is, therefore, whether this exceptional judicial
undertaking rests on some present, valid, federal purpose. If not, it is a
function that should plainly be surrendered....
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 235 (1948). Exercise of diversity jurisdiction has
occasioned considerable soul-searching among legal scholars. A furious
debate has raged over the question of whether the federal courts should con-
tinue to exercise jurisdiction over cases grounded in diversity, see H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
892-97 (1953); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT]; Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of the
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928); Yntema & Jafin, Pre-
liminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. Rxv. 869, 873-76
(1931).
' Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ; accord, Indianapolis v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 77 (1941).
Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905).
1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26
at 14546 (Wright rev. 1960); WRIGHT § 30 at 83 (1963).
' Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Venner v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 209 U.S. 24 (1908); Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); De
Pinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
'WRIGHT § 30 at 83.
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recent case of Reed v. Robilio.f The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to accept the identity of interest at law between an executor
and the sole heir as conclusive of alignment in an action brought
on behalf of the estate. The court held that the antagonism of the
executor to the heir's claim precluded realignment of the executor as
a party plaintiff.10 The plaintiff in Robilio was a citizen of New
York. Contending that the sum paid for her deceased father's in-
terest in a foods-processing partnership was grossly inadequate,'
the plaintiff demanded that the executors of her parents' estates bring
suit against the purchasers, her father's former partners and their
relatives. The executors refused to sue whereupon she brought this
action alleging breach of a partner's fiduciary duty. The executors,
citizens of Tennessee, were joined with the individual defendants,
also citizens of Tennessee. Although the complaint alleged no wrong-
doing on the part of the executors and sought no relief against them,
both filed answers which denied the allegations of the complaint and
asserted fairness of the transaction as an affirmative defense.12 Dur-
ing the trial, the executors acted as parties adversary to the plaintiff ."
The jurisdictional issue was not raised until the fifth week of the
trial on the trial judge's own motion.'4 The district court concluded
that the conduct of the executors was "inexplicable"'" but that it
'376 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'g 248 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Tenn.
1965).
* In the district court, the plaintiff joined the executor of her father's
estate, Planters National Bank of Memphis, and the executor of her mother's
estate, an attorney; but the executor of the mother's estate was discharged
prior to the appellate argument, and the court of appeals ordered dismissal of
the action as to him. 376 F.2d at 394. Thus only the bank's position in the
litigation was at issue before the court of appeals.
11 Pursuant to the father's will the bank as his executor undertook to sell
his interest in the partnership. Its trust officer negotiated the price and the
terms of the sale to the real defendants; the sale, and certain new partnership
terms, were approved by the plaintiff's mother, acting upon the advice of the
attorney who ultimately became her executor. 248 F. Supp. at 604.
12376 F.2d at 393.
31d. The executors submitted interrogatories to the plaintiff, objected
to the testimony of her witnesses and argued against her on points of law.
The bank went so far as to put its trust officer on the stand to testify in
support of the real defendants' position. 248 F. Supp. at 616.1 248 F. Supp. at 605.
" No reason is assigned in either decision for the hostility of the execu-
tors to plaintiff's claim on behalf of the estates. While the cause of the an-
tagonism is unknown, it is possible that the bank and the attorney were
motivated at least in part by a desire to protect their professional reputa-
tions. The bank's trust officer actually negotiated the sale and obtained the
price which plaintiff attacked as "grossly inadequate." The other executor
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was "not determinative of the jurisdictional issue."' " The court
then realigned the executors as parties plaintiff according to the
ultimate interest test and dismissed the action.17
In reversing and remanding the case the court of appeals ac-
knowledged the prevalence of the ultimate interest test but refused
to deem it controlling.' 8 The court relied on the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Smith v. Sperling9 and drew an analogy between
the heir-executor situation in Robilio and the stockholder-corporation
situation in Sperling.2" According to the court of appeals, Sperling
stands for two propositions: first, that the relevant test in the stock-
holder situation is whether the corporation is antagonistic to the en-
forcement of the claim and second, that the refusal of the corpora-
tion to sue is evidence of that antagonism.21 Both criteria were
found to be present in Robilio. The court noted that the rule ob-
taining in stockholders' suits "is not far removed" from the rule
applicable in other derivative actions.2 Finding that the rule of
Sperling could be applied to the situation in Robilio, the court of
appeals declined to limit Sperling to stockholders' derivative suits
until the Supreme Court had done so.m
The court's extension of Sperling to a non-stockholder situation
is not necessarily precluded by other Supreme Court decisions on re-
alignment which have utilized the ultimate interest test. A trustee
and his beneficiary,24 a lessor and his co-lessor,25 a mortgagee and
its mortgagor,28 and a parent corporation and its subsidiary, 7 all
advised (or at least permitted) plaintiff's mother to accept the price. Pos-
sibly they interpreted the attack on the transaction as an attack on their pro-
fessional competency and reacted accordingly. See note 11 supra.
Is 248 F. Supp at 616.
"' Especially when the nominal defendants, as here, are fiduciaries, will the
Court presume that their interests coincide with the interests of the de-
cedents' estates. It will take more than a showing of personal, hostile
attitudes to displace this presumption.
Id. 18 Id. 376 F.2d at 394.
Is 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
20 376 F.2d at 395.
" Id.; see Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957). Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Sperling was directed against the second proposition, 354
U.S. at 105.
22 376 F.2d at 395.
" Id. at 395-96.
" Hamer v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266 (1917).
"Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542 (1925).
20 Dawson v. Columbia Ave Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905).
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U.S. 77 (1920).
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of whom had the same legal interests as against the real defendants,
have been realigned so as to oust jurisdiction. In none of these
cases, however, were the parties actually antagonistic to each other.
The possibility of antagonism was negated by findings of collusion
to create jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.2 8 The
assertion by the plaintiff of a claim which is properly the claim of
the nominal defendant has supported a finding of collusion, 2 as has
a request by the nominal defendant in his answer that the prayer for
relief be granted.30 Admission in the complaint that a party has been
joined as a defendant because joinder as a plaintiff would defeat
diversity has been taken as an admission of collusion.3 These cases
suggest that the Supreme Court has consistently applied the ultimate
interest test where the facts of the case create a suspicion that the
parties have collusively arranged alignment so as to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts. It may be said that the ultimate interest
test, as applied, is a defensive device to defeat collusive expansion of
diversity jurisdiction. 2
The antagonism test developed in the stockholders' cases takes a
functional approach to the problem of alignment. Antagonism, for
the purposes of alignment, is not the subjective state of hostility or
8 In Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905), the
Court found that a suit brought by a mortgagee to compel a Georgia city to
perform its contract with the Georgia mortgagor was brought "solely for
the purpose of reopening in the United States Court a controversy which had
been decided against it in the courts of the State," and ordered dismissal.
"8See Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (mortgagee
sought to establish that a lease given by the mortgagor was binding upon the
assignee of the lessee); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union,
254 U.S. 77 (1920) (parent corporation sued to enjoin the union from em-
ploying violence and intimidation in a strike at a subsidiary's plant); Hamer
v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266 (1917) (bondholders sued to enforce a
judgment which the trustee had secured against the defaulting issuer).
" Hamer v. New York Rys. Co., 244 U.S. 266, 274 (1917).
" Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 543 (1925).
12In two cases involving similar fact situations, the Supreme Court in-
voked the ultimate interest test to preserve federal jurisdiction where it would
not exist if the antagonism test were applied. Sharpe v. Bonham, 224 U.S.
241 (1912) and Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U.S. 32 (1911) involved a dispute over
church properties between the national Presbyterian Church in the United
States and a dissident group of Tennessee Presbyterians. The parties whose
alignment was at issue were the holders of legal title to the properties. In
both cases, they were members of the "national" faction. Notwithstanding
their personal antagonism to the dissidents, the title holders were aligned
with them in actions brought by out-of-state members of the national faction.
The Supreme Court refused to permit alignment, holding that the title-
holders were at law neutral stakeholders in the dispute and should not be
realigned as parties plaintiff so as to destroy diversity.
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personal animosity but the objective fact of "real collision" between
the parties"3 as revealed "by the pleadings and the nature of the
dispute."34 The Supreme Court has attempted neither to delve into
the motives of corporate directors nor to determine whether they
harbor personal animosity toward the complaining stockholder. 35
Instead the Court has looked to the conduct of the management and
to the position they have taken on behalf of the corporation in the
pleadings. The refusal of directors to sue"6 and the denial of an
opportunity for the complaining stockholder to present his charges
to the directors have been held to constitute sufficient antagonism to
defeat realignment.3 7 Antagonism may also be established if the
corporation unites with the real defendants in filing pleadings which
deny the plaintiff's charges of wrongdoing.38 In short, "There is
antagonism whenever the management is aligned against the stock-
holder and defends a course of conduct which he attacks.13
9
Judicial acceptance of Robilio need not abrogate ultimate interest
as the general test for realignment. The ultimate interests of the
parties will continue to be the basis for realignment but with an
exception recognized where antagonism is actually present. In
Robilio the sterile application of the ultimate interest test would
have created a danger of substantial injustice to the plaintiff. The
effect of the district court's decision would have been to compel the
New York plaintiff to bring her action in the courts of Tennessee.
With the Tennessee executors and defendants vigorously denying
the unfairness of the transaction, the possibility of prejudice to
plaintiff's claim cannot be overlooked. There can be little doubt
that the "matter in controversy" was in reality "between citizens of
different states."40 Application of the antagonism test merely recog-
nized the existence of that controversy and preserved federal juris-
diction in an appropriate situation.
WILLIAM V. MCPHERSON, JR.
"Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1957).
"Id. at 97.
"The Court noted in Sperling that the refusal to take action which con-
stituted antagonism might have been made "for any number of reasons."
354 U.S. at 96.
"354 U.S. at 95.
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 588 (1905).
"Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24, 32 (1908).
"Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957).1"28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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International Law-Conflicting Jurisdictions
The recent case involving Mehdi Eatessami, 1 an Iranian-born
Israeli citizen extradited from New York to Switzerland, points out
again, this time in the context of international extradition, the warn-
ing of the New York Court of Appeals2 that the "center of gravity"8
concept so important in choice of laws is not fungible with the con-
cept of "minimal contacts" for jurisdictional purposes.
Eatessami was accused by the Swiss of having masterminded
a loan swindle against the Swiss Bank Corporation. Accounti
opened with the main office of the Swiss Bank, in Geneva, were
filled with counterfeit stock certificates prepared and mailed from
New York. Subsequent loans totalling 300,000 dollars were se-
cured and the proceeds paid to Eatessami and his confederates
through New York banks.
In an earlier tort action brought in the New York state courts
for fraud,4 the question of jurisdiction under section 302 (a) (2) of
the New York procedure act had been determined. That section pro-
vides that New York courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a
nondomiciliary who "commits a tortious act within the state... ,5
and coincides with similar "long-arm" statutes enacted in other
states.6 In this pre-trial determination of jurisdiction, a finding
that the various fraudulent communications between Eatessami and
the Swiss Bank had been prepared and mailed in New York supplied
the necessary acts to support jurisdiction without violation of due
process. The court did not determine which law, Swiss or New
York, would apply in a trial on the issues. Generally, choice of laws
United States ex rel. Eatessami v. Morasco, 275 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
'Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 463, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (1965).
That jurisdiction would be the "center of gravity" whose law and pub-
lic policy is most concerned with the issues raised by the litigation. See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283-84 (1963).
"Swiss Bank Corp. v. Eatessami, 26 App. Div. 2d 287, 273 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
N.Y.R. Civ. PiAc. 302 (a) (2) (McKinney 1967).
"See, e.g., N.C. GEn. STAT. § 55-145 (1966). Compare Totero v. World
Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1963) with
Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
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teaches that the law of the place of the last occurrence necessary
to make the actor liable governs.7 However, determining whether
that last event is the receipt of the fraudulently obtained funds (New
York), or the making of the fraudulent representation (Geneva), is
unconnected with the question of jurisdiction. Under certain situa-
tions, New York may assert personal jurisdiction, yet be required to
apply the law of a sister state, or of a foreign nation.'
Yet little more than a year later, the Swiss government filed a
formal request9 for the extradition of Eatessami. Extradition, the
established method of recovery of the international fugitive,'0 is
governed in the United States by treaty" and federal statute,12 and
H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 168 (1964).
' Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Walton v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 233 F.2d Cir. 1956, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
'A formal request for extradition requires authenticated documents sup-
porting the requesting state's contention that the surrender of the accused is
justified, including identification of the accused, a statement of the charges
with texts of the relevant laws, a warrant for arrest, depositions and related
evidence. Memorandum in opposition to writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf
of the Swiss government, Dkt. No. 67 Civil 3983 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
o See, e.g., Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5
(1936). The actual proceedings differ, however, from normal probable cause
cause hearings. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1964) permits the de-
manding country to introduce ex parte depositions gathered at home, but the
defendant may not do likewise. In re Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890).
Nor can the accused introduce evidence which contradicts the demanding
country's proof, Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); nor evidence to
establish an alibi, Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1927); nor
evidence of insanity, Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); nor evidence
that the statute of limitations has run, unless the treaty otherwise provides,
Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1963). Furthermore,
an American citizen may be held for extradition on deposition evidence which
would not be admissible at a preliminary hearing on a domestic crime.
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221
U.S. 508, 512 (1911) ; Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1965).
Indeed, "all the fictitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law" are ab-
sent. Gluckman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). See, Note 61 COL L.
REv. 105 (1961) ; cf. Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice,
[1964] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77.
"1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1964). Extradition can take place only in pur-
suance to a treaty. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
"See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1964). Interstate rendition is generally
controlled by the Uniform Extradition Act, now adopted by all states except
Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, and
Washington. New York and Rhode Island adopted the Act, amending sec-
tion 6, so as to provide for "double-criminality," i.e., the offense must be
criminal in both states. N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 834 (McKinney 1967);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-9-8 (1956). See, e.g., People ex rel. Burtman
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committed solely to the federal government as an adjunct of the
treaty power.' 3 Usually, the jurisdiction of the requesting state
and that of the requested or asylum state over the accused is based
upon the principle of territoriality. 4 That is, the particular treaty
offense' 5 must have been committed within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the requesting state, and the fugitive found within the
territory of the asylum state.' 6 Arguably, upon reviewing the finding
of the United States Commissioner that Switzerland had sufficient
basis for a claim to criminal jurisdiction over Eatessami, the federal
district court was obligated to take notice of the similar proceedings
of its New York counterpart. While full faith and credit does not
generally apply between federal and state courts beyond enforce-
v. Silberglitt, 15 Misc. 2d 847, 187 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (books
obscene in Pennsylvania not in New York); People ex rel. Albert v.
Commissioner of Correction, 111 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (gaming
tables illegal in Maryland are "games of skill" in New York).
"s U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. While the executive has no inherent power to
extradite on its own initiative, Valentine v. United States cx rel. Niedecker,
299 U.S. 5 (1936), Congress does enjoy plenary power over aliens, Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952), and the immigration law "bristles
with severities," Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961). See also
United States ex rel. Feretic v. Shaughnessy, 211 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir.
1955); it re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States
ex rel Paschalides v. District Comm'r, 143 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
" See Berge, Criminat Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30
MicH. L. REV. 238 (1931). But see the criticism of the territorial principle
by Judge Frank in Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543
& n.5 (2d Cir. 1956).
" Local law is used in defining the particular "treaty offense." See
Petitt v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 207, 218 (1904); United States ex rel.
Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Gonzales, 217 F.
Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" The fugitive may have been in the asylum state when the crime was com-
mitted. United States v. Steinberg, 67 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 640 (1932); Wacker v. Beeson [sic], 256 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La.
1966), aff'd, Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 936 (1967). See also In re Harris, 170 Ohio St. 151, 163 N.E.2d 762,
10 Ohio Op. 2d 99 (1959) (non-support constitutes an "act" within thejurisdiction of the requesting state, for extradition purposes).
"' Here review of the commissioner's decision was through habeas corpus,
an alternative is an action for a declaratory judgment. Wacker v. Bisson,
348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965). The scope of review, in any case, is the
same. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956). The reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the
offense was within the treaty, and whether there is probable cause to believe
the accused guilty. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922). The courts test
only the legality of the extradition proceedings; the wisdom of extradition
remains for the executive to decide. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964). See Note, 62
COL. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1962); Note, 61 MicH. L. Rzv. 383, 387 (1962).
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ment of judgments,' 8 except in the taxation field,'" the Supreme
Court has been reluctant 20 to upset state court findings of jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, federal courts have followed state jurisdictional
laws in cases involving nondomiciliaries. 2 ' Furthermore, the deter-
mination of the state court that it had civil jurisdiction over Eates-
sami because of certain tortious acts done in New York, would im-
ply that it also had criminal jurisdiction,22 as those same acts were
criminal under New York statute.23 Ordinarily, the territorial
sovereign, being competent to prosecute for offenses committed
within its territory, would not extradite for such an offense.
24
However, without reference or mention of the New York court's
findings, the federal court found the extradition proceedings legal,
and following the approval of the Secretary of State, Eatessami was
extradited to Switzerland.25
Was the federal district court correct? First, it is important to
realize that it was concerned with treaty law.2" Familiar learning
teaches that treaties override state laws when a conflict arises. Be-
' Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
10 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Worcester County Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937).
20 Except in extraordinary circumstances. Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S.
398, 342 (1939) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
1 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 1966)
(concurring opinion); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221
(2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1930(1) (McKinney 1967).
"3 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 881(3), 884(5) (McKinney 1967).
' Evans, The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 Am.
J. INT'L L. 351, 354 (1965).
" Extradition was approved by the Secretary of State on the charges of
obtaining money by false pretenses and the fraudulent use of counterfeited or
forged private instruments. However, the Secretary determined that the
record did not contain evidence that such instruments were counterfeited or
forged in Switzerland, and so refused extradition for the forgery charge.
Letter from the Secretary of State to the Swiss Ambassador, January 12,
1968. Eatessami was extradited on January 13, 1968 and will be tried under
Articles 148 and 251 of the Swiss Criminal Code, relating to embezzlement
and use of counterfeit securities. The Swiss statute provides for a maximum
sentence of five years imprisonment. Letter from Bernard J. Reverdin to the
writer February 23, 1968.
"
0Art. II § 4 of the Extradition Treaty Between the United States and
Switzerland of May 14, 1900, 31 Stat. 1928, 1929 (1900), T.S. No. 354
(effective February 28, 1901), provides:
Extradition shall be granted for . . . (4) The counterfeiting or forgery
of public or private instruments; the fraudulent use of counterfeited or
forged instruments.
Cf. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879), reVg, 69 Va. 62 (1877).
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yond reference to the applicable New York law for definition of the
elements of the relevant treaty offense, the state jurisdictional law
was not considered. Secondly, reference to New York state court
decisions would support the conclusion of the federal court that
indeed a crime, or at least punishable elements of a crime, had been
committed within the territory of the requesting state, in this case
Switzerland. In People v. Adams 7 New York courts convicted an
Ohio resident of the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses,
though the defendant was, at the time of the crime and for a while
thereafter, in Ohio, and did not come to New York until later.
Similarly, in People v. Zayas,2" the New York court held that it
had jurisdiction to try the defendant for a crime committed partially
in New York, where the false pretenses were made, and partially
in Pennsylvania, where the money was received. Thus, by New
York standards, culpable elements of the alleged crime had been
committed in Switzerland, though Eatessami had remained all the
while in New York.
Thirdly, the federal court apparently realized that the New York
court was not attempting to assert a preEmptive jurisdiction. Had
the New York court asserted exclusive jurisdiction based upon the
"center of gravity" concepts familiar to choice of laws, the question
might have been different. However, by merely determining that
it had jurisdiction because of certain "minimal contacts" with the
state, the New York court did not foreclose the assertion of a supple-
mental jurisdiction by another state,29 such as Switzerland. And,
as the federal court emphasized, any excessively complicated and
technical application of traditional jurisdictional concepts is ill-suited
to deal with the problems of multinational crime.80 Thus the federal
court was probably correct, and was able to insure the fulfillment of
national treaty obligations without offending federalistic guidelines.
K. G. ROBINSON, JR.
273 Denio (N.Y.) 190, aff'd 1 N.Y. 173 (1848).
-8217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916).
Cf. United States v. Arnhold & S. Bleichroeder, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Eisler v. Soskin, 272 App. Div. 894, 71 N.Y.S.2d 682,
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 841, 78 N.E.2d 862 (1948).
"
0 See Re Vignoni, 17 Int'l L. Rep. 263, 264 (Chile, Sup. Ct. 1950).
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Real Property-Eminent Domain-The Public Use Requirement
It is axiomatic that a governmental taking of private property
must be for a public use.' However, when "we come to seek for the
principles upon which the question of public use is to be determined,
or to define the words, 'public use,' in the light of judicial decisions,
we find ourselves utterly at sea."2 Recently the North Carolina Su-
preme Court encountered this difficulty in dealing with an exercise
of the power of eminent domain to induce industry to settle in a
certain locale. In Highway Commission v. Thorton3 the court
stated that
[t]he home or other property of a poor man cannot be taken
from him by eminent domain and turned over to the private use
of a wealthy individual or corporation merely because the latter
may be expected to spend more money in the community, even
though he or it threatens to settle elsewhere if this is not done.
This the Constitution forbids.4
Despite other like assurances to North Carolina landowners, how-
ever, the court upheld a condemnation of private property for the
purpose of constructing a road running from a public highway across
the condemned property to a private trucking terminal. In so hold-
ing the court has apparently adopted a more liberal and, from the
condemnee's point of view, less protective theory of public use.
Indeed, the decision may well have sounded the death knell for a
meaningful public use limitation on the power of eminent domain in
North Carolina.
The history of the public use requirement is largely one of ju-
dicial struggling to define the concept in light of earlier ideas and
needs of society that may not have validity today.5 Two con-
flicting views have emerged.6 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century
12 P. NicHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1 (3d rev. ed. 1963) [herein-
after cited as NicioLs] ; 26 Am. JUR. Eminent Domain § 25 (1966). For a
North Carolina case see, City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d
600 (1946).
- 1 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DO1AIN 410 (2d ed. 1900).
271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967).
'Id. at 243, 156 S.E.2d at 260.
See 2 NIcHOLS § 7.21; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the
Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940); Benbow, Pliblic Use
As a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEXAS L.
REv. 1499 (1966); Note, 13 DRAK- L. REv. 95 (1963); Note, 50 IowA L.
REv. 799 (1965).
'See 2 NicHoLs § 7.2.
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there was little need for stringent limitations on the power of eminent
domain. With the advent of huge corporations and the growing
scarcity of land, however, the necessity of insuring against an arbi-
trary exercise of the power became manifest. The "use by the pub-
lic" test was developed to fill this gap in property protection. Under
this theory "use" is defined as employment by the public. 7 Thus the
public must use or employ the facility for which the taking was made.
In addition, the private benefits which usually attend the construction
of a road or other project must be incidental to the benefit intended
for and received by the public.' A determination that the taking
is primarily for the advantage of a private individual or that the
public has no right of user in the facility will invalidate the taking.
When new ideas developed that involved government as a posi-
tive instrument of social and economic reform, the courts were con-
fronted with the narrowness of the public use test. The response was
a determination that "use" could mean not only employment, but
also benefit or advantage. In jurisdictions accepting this definition,
a taking which tends to promote the welfare or productivity of the
community is deemed to be for a public use. It is immaterial that
the benefit results directly to a private individual or corporation or
that the public has no right to use the facility.
While various statements of the supreme court would seem to
indicate that the benefit theory is familiar to North Carolina law, 10
a review of several cases shows the contrary to be true. Stratford
v. City of Greensboro1 involved a proposed condemnation to link
'See, e.g., Cozard v. Hardware Co., 139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).
'See, e.g., Stratford v. City of Greensboro, 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394
(1899). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R. 9, 24 (1928).
' For a collection of authorities which support this doctrine see 2 NICHOLS
§ 7.2(2) n.9.
"An example is found in Reed v. Highway Comm'n, 209 N.C. 648, 184
S.E. 513 (1936), wherein the court stated
[i]t is a matter of common knowledge, shall we term it, "the tourist in-
dustry" is now in the mountain sections of this State one of its most
valuable assets to the people of that section. These scenic roads do much
to encourage tourists to come into this "land of the sky," locate and spend
the summer, and put into circulation money which is of great benefit to
the people. In taking over a road to be part of the highway system, this
purpose can be considered on the aspect of the road being taken over for
a public and not a private purpose. These beautiful mountains ought not
to be shut off from the public by selfish persons or interests.
Id. at 654, 184 S.E. at 516-17. It might be noted that the road in Thorton
had no scenic appeal.
" 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394 (1899).
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two major streets by a third. There was evidence showing a contract
between the condemnor-municipality and a landowner who stood to
gain from the new street whereby the latter agreed to pay for the
rights-of-way and to move certain businesses to the city. 2 The court
stated that "[i] f the substantial benefit was for the defendant...
as an individual, and the benefit to the city only incidental and
purely prospective, then the proceedings of the board were ultra
vires and void.' 3 In holding unconstitutional a statute which au-
thorized owners of timber lands to condemn private rights-of-way,
the court in Cozard v. Hardware Company14 expressly rejected the
public benefit theory. The court noted "[t] hat great and dangerous
monopolies have been fostered by the liberal construction put upon
the term 'public use' "'I and questioned whether meaningful limits
could be devised under such a definition. In Highway Commission
v. Batts"' the court reversed a lower court determination that a pub-
lic use existed in relation to a proposal to widen and pave an existing
dirt road which served several rural landowners. Although the
court conceded that there would be a right of user on the part of the
public, the main benefit was found to be in the landowners who de-
sired the new road. As in Stratford the court seemed to rely on ele-
ments indicating something less than a good faith concern with the
public interest. In Stratford it was the contract,17 while here a shell
house had been erected to meet a Commission requirement that four
houses front a rural road and certain misrepresentations had been
made to the County Board of Commissioners.
In Thorton the property purchased by Associated Transport for
its terminal was landlocked at the time of purchase. It appears that
Associated was persuaded to select this particular site through the
assurances of the Burlington-Alamance County Chamber of Com-
merce that the Highway Commission would secure a right-of-way
across defendant's land and construct an access road thereon. The
Chamber of Commerce was apparently able to guarantee the High-
2 The fact that in their respective answers the city denied while the
private citizen admitted the contract was noted by the court. Id. at 131,
32 S.E. at 395-96.
Id. at 134-35, 32 S.E. at 397.
"139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).
Id. at 291, 51 S.E. at 935.
"265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965).
11 That the contract indicated a promotion of a private interest was
recognized in Allen v. Town of Reidsville, 178 N.C. 513, 101 S.E. 267 (1919).
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way Commission's action,'" for construction was begun shortly
thereafter. The road was to be constructed upon an existing private
graveled road built by the defendant to provide a means of ingress
and egress to his own home and to two rented dwellings.'9 Ten
months later and after completion of ninety-six per cent of the
work the defendant filed his answer denying that the taking was for
a public use.2" The evidence presented by the plaintiff showed As-
sociated to be a large trucking concern with a substantial local em-
ployment. The road would serve these employees, suppliers, cus-
tomers and visitors. The lower court, relying on Batts, found that
any benefit to the public was incidental to that received by Associated
and enjoined completion of the road.
The supreme court reversed. Denying adoption of the public
benefit test of a public use, the court found the facts sufficient to
bring the case within the "use by the public" test because of the
large number of users disclosed by the evidence. The dissenters,
however, strongly protested the decision and analyzed its implica-
tions by stating that
[t]his decision . . . establishes the power of the State Highway
Commission to condemn a right-of-way for a road to the plant of
any private industry with a payroll which the Chamber of Com-
merce, or some other group able to influence the Highway Com-
mission, decides is large enough to benefit the economy of the
community. It is a decision which will rise to haunt not only this
Court but the Highway Commission, for any private corporation
can now say to it, "Condemn us a road and we will employ
enough people so that you can justify it as a public road." But
how many employees are enough to make "a public?" And surely
the applicant for a "public road" must be a business big enough
and so well established as to justify confidence in its continuing
payroll. But what of the rights of the entrepreneur in this land of
" It is puzzling how a Chamber of Commerce was able to guarantee the
Commission's action with such assurance and certainty. The court does not
give this fact any attention, and a further discussion would be beyond the
purposes of this note.
"9 The Highway Commission's argument that its action was an accep-
tance of defendant's dedication of this road to the public use was rejected.
"0 On the basis of this fact the Highway Commission contended that the
defendant was guilty of laches. The court pointed out, however, that N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-107 (1964) gives the condemnee twelve months within
which to answer the Commission's complaint. For a discussion of North
Carolina's complex statutory scheme of eminent domain see Phay, The
Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The Need for Legislative
Action, 45 N.C.L. Rlv. 587 (1967).
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equal opportunity? Is only Big Business to be thus "encouraged
to locate" here ?21
Notwithstanding the majority's declaration to the contrary, the dis-
senters saw an unqualified adoption of the public benefit test.
On the basis of Stratford and Batts it is difficult to find fault
with the dissenters' conclusion. Stratford presented a much clearer
public use as the proposed street would link two major arteries in a
large city, whereas in Thorton the road ended in a cul de sac at a
private business enterprise.22 The Batts case, it is submitted, cannot
be reconciled with Thorton on the basis of the public use test. There
are three main grounds upon which it could be contended that the
cases are distinguishable, but none suffice to explain the different
results under the public use test. The first difference is that in
Thorton Associated was landlocked. The court pays little attention
to this fact, however, for the situation was the fault not of Mr.
Thorton but of Associated and the Chamber of Commerce.' Sec-
ondly, in Batts only several citizens stood to gain while a large cor-
poration was the beneficiary of the new road in Thorton. If this
distinction accounts for the difference in results, then clearly the
benefit test is being applied; for, as noted above, the narrow doctrine
was developed to prevent takings for the benefit of industrial
giants at the expense of the small landholders. The number of per-
sons who would use the road in each case suggests the third major
difference. In Batts only the owners of the abutting land and a few
of their friends would have occasion to use the road, while in
Thorton a number of employees and others having business with
Associated would traverse the road. If numbers are so important
to the court, then the decision may well stand for its definition of
"public." The dissent counters the majority's reliance on the dif-
ference in numbers by pointing out that the road was not con-
1 Highway Comm'n v. Thorton, 271 N.C. 227, 245, 156 S.E.2d 248, 262
(1967).
-- The mere fact that a road ends in a cid de sac does not, however, make
it a private road. Highway Comm'n v. Batts, 265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126
(1965).
21 It could be contended that the assurances by the Chamber of Commerce
and the diligent efforts by that body in Associated Transport's behalf could
serve to indicate a motive unacceptable under the public use test as did the
contract in Stratford and sham dwelling and false representations in Batts.
It is also interesting to speculate whether an action would lie against the
Chamber of Commerce if the Highway Commission failed to act as guaran-
teed.
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structed for the public as that term is generally understood. '2 4 Even
if it were conceded that only persons having business with As-
sociated can constitute "a public," it is almost impossible to find the
benefit to Associated purely incidental to the use by such a public
as is required under the public use test.25
If North Carolina has now adopted the public benefit theory,
it is not alone in its choice.2" In fact, many writers applaud such a
move as the shedding of the shackles of a past age.27 These com-
mentators see in the public use test a potential for judicial stifling
of needed social and economic reform. It must be pointed out,
however, that sweeping aside such impediments to reform as the
right of private property may present a case where the cure is
worse than the disease. Neither the state's need for new industry
nor the rights to private property should be so exalted as to pre-
clude recognition of the other. A fair balance must be struck and
from this it follows that neither test alone is sufficient in all cases.
Carried to their logical extremes either test would validate takings
clearly beyond constitutional permissibility. 28
On final analysis Thorton discloses an attempt by the supreme
court to strike this balance within the framework of the older pub-
lic use theory. But in allowing the Highway Commission to con-
demn private property as an inducement to new industry the court
has, at the least, tacitly relied on the benefit line of reasoning while
paying lip service to the public use test. Although this is not mnahm
ini se,2° it is not clear why the court chose to do so in a case in
which the equities were so heavily in favor of the condemnee80
" Highway Comm'n v. Thorton, 271 N.C. 227, 246, 156 S.E.2d 248, 262
(1967).
.' See note 8 supra.
26 See note 9 supra.
"Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain,
20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940); Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on the
Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1499 (1966); Com-
ment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requien,
58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
"For example the public use test would not be violated by a taking
for the purpose of constructing theaters or hotels, while the public benefit
theory would allow the government to redistribute property to those who
could employ it best. 2 NicnoLs § 7.2[3].
2" One writer suggests that retention of the public use test in name
only may have some deterrent effect on the over zealous use of the power of
eminent domain. Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of
Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1499 (1966).
" This statement represents the view of the writer. It is not based on any
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If industry is to be given so unbridled a hand in locating, the fears
expressed by the dissenters may well be realized. The ultimate im-
plications which the decision may have on the power of eminent
domain and the existing theories of land ownership cannot be ade-
quately assessed until the court provides clarification in future cases.
Such a clarification of the court's position is in order not only for the
benefit of the Bar and the Highway Commission, but more im-
portantly for the North Carolina landowner.
LAURENCE V. SENN, JR.
Survivorship-Joint Bank Accounts with the Right
of Survivorship in North Carolina
In 1784, North Carolina abolished the right of survivorship as
an incident of joint tenancy,' but the state supreme court held that
oral and written contracts making the rights of the parties dependent
on survivorship remained valid.' Thereafter, it was generally ac-
cepted that joint bank accounts with the right of survivorship could
one fact but on the seeming unfairness of the decision. The Record reveals
numerous efforts by individual members of the Burlington-Alamance
County Chamber of Commerce to persuade Mr. Thorton to donate or sell his
land so that Associated Transport would not move from the area. Mild hints
of possible litigation were resorted to when Mr. Thorton indicated that he
was not "community-minded" enough to allow large, noisy tractor-trailer
trucks to cross his land "24 hours a day." Highway Comm'n v. Thorton,
271 N.C. 227, 233, 156 S.E.2d 248, 253 (1967). At no time did Associated or
the Highway Commission approach Mr. Thorton. Here then a small land-
owner of limited means runs afoul of the desire of a body of non-elective
business leaders to keep business within the area. While their purpose is
commendable, the methods employed are not.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1966).
'Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202 (1895).
The contract theory has been used by a growing number of courts in other
states to uphold the joint bank account with the right of survivorship. Hill
v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870 (1951); Malone v. Sullivan, 136
Kan. 193, 14 P.2d 647 (1932); Bishop v. Bishop's Ex'rs, 293 Ky. 652, 170
S.W.2d 1 (1943); Chippendale v. North Adams Say. Bank, 222 Mass. 499,
111 N.E. 371 (1915); Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934);
Deal's Adm'r v. Merchants and Mechanics Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135
(1917).
For a discussion of the contract theory and other legal theories by which
the courts have tried to test the validity of the joint bank account with the
right of survivorship, see Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Ac-
count-a Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. Rnv. 596 (1953); Kepner,
Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. REv.
376 (1959); and Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 95 (1952).
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be created, and the principal issue litigated was whether the parties
had effectively established such an account. The accounts were
basically of two types-joint accounts where a written agreement'
provided for the right of survivorship and ones where there was not
such an agreement. In the former the court upheld the claim of sur-
vivorship,3 but in the latter its decision hinged on whether there
were circumstances indicating the parties' intent to create the right
of survivorship. With sufficient evidence of such intent the court
reasoned there was a right of survivorship ;4 without such evidence
the court held that the party not depositing the funds was merely an
agent for the depositor.6
In 1959 the legislature, in an attempt to clarify the law, passed
a statute6 that required the parties to sign a written agreement 7
expressly providing for the right of survivorship.8 While this statute
applied only to husband and wife deposit accounts,9 an amendment
passed in 196310 eliminated this restriction and brought accounts
opened by any two or more persons with a banking institution1'
'E.g, Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).
'See, e.g., Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E.2d 366 (1940), where
the husband assigned building and loan association stock in his name alone to
himself or his wife "either or the survivor." Then he had the stock trans-
ferred and reissued stating that he wanted the survivor to be able to cash in
the stock "without the usual red tape." These facts combined with the wife's
possession of the stock resulted in a finding that a common ownership with
the right of survivorship had been created, although there was no formal
contract. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, allowed a partial
new trial because of erroneous instructions to the jury.
E.g., Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N.C. 362, 171 S.E. 341 (1933).
'Ch. 404 [1959] N.C. Sess. L. (amended 1963).
'The written agreement could be either on a signature card or by
separate instrument. However, the requirement that the agreement be writ-
ten was the only element of the statutory account contrary to the common
law accounts.
Ch. 404 [1959] N.C. Sess. L. (amended 1963).
'Id.
(e) As used in this section:
(2) "Deposit account" includes both time and demand deposits in
commercial banks and industrial banks, installment shares, optional
shares and fully paid share certificates in building and loan associa-
tions and savings and loan associations, and deposits and shares in
credit unions.
oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (1966).
11 Id.
(e) As used in this section:
(1) "Banking institution" includes commercial banks, industrial
banks, building and loan associations, savings and loan associations,
and credit unions.
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within its purview. 2 This amendment did not alter the basic pre-
requisite of an express written agreement.
Assuming a joint bank account has been established, however,
certain questions still remain. What are the legal incidents which
follow from its creation? This question can best be answered by
considering the accounts at two points in time-while the parties
are living and when one party dies.
The common law and statutory law attached certain incidents to
joint accounts while the parties were still living. At common law,13
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the parties were deemed
to own the account equally.'4 Furthermore, creditors of each could
attach the account to the extent of the interest of the particular
debtor.3 It should be noted here that the common law was supple-
mented in 1919 by N.C. GEN. STAT § 53-146 (1965), which pro-
vided that when an account was opened in the names of two persons
payable to either, withdrawal by one party discharged the banking
institution from liability to the other party. 6
Under subsequent statutes the law remained much the same.
With respect to the incidents which attach during the lifetime of
the parties to a husband and wife account, the 1959 statute" with a
few minor exceptions was essentially a comprehensive codification
'2 Id.: (a) "A dposit account may be established with a banking institution
in the names of two or more persons ......
"3 For the purposes of this comment the common law of joint bank ac-
counts is defined in the following manner: with respect to husband and wife
accounts the North Carolina case law prior to 1959 is referred to; and
with respect to accounts established by parties not husband and wife, the
case law prior to 1963 is referred to.
1 Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961). A joint bank
account with the right of survivorship was involved but the account also
provided that the deposit "shall be for the use and benefit of both of us."
Id. at 153, 120 S.E.2d at 577.
' Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
10 This statute did not affect the interests of the parties in the funds but
only afforded protection for the banking institutions. The bank could pay
out the balance to the survivor if the account was established in two names,
payable to either or the survivor, but the surviving party could not prevail
in an action by the decedent's estate for the decedent's portion of the funds
unless the account had been created by a contract providing for the right of
survivorship. Also, a question arose as to whether the bank was protected
when the account was in the names of more than two persons.
Similar statutes have been passed in many states, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 13-2039 (1967), which was enacted in 1919 and is almost an exact replica
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1965).
" Ch. 404 [1959] N.C. Sess. L. (amended 1963).
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of the common law and the 1917 statute.'" It specifically stated that
either party could withdraw, 19 and such a withdrawal was a complete
discharge of the banking institution.20  Although the statute in-
cluded no provision relating to the inter vivos ownership of the
funds,2' it provided that during the lifetime of the parties the ac-
count was subject to their respective debts to the extent that each had
contributed. If their respective contributions could not be deter-
mined, it stated that the funds would be deemed to be owned equally
for this purpose.22 With respect to the legal incidents while the par-
ties are living, the 1963 amendment makes no changes.
When one party to an account died, the common law,23 the
1959 statute24 and 1963 amended version of that statute2 all pro-
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1965).
19 Such a provision was one of the more important terms of the common
law account and, although this is an incident of the creation of the statutory
account, the sample agreement set out in the 1959 statute and the 1963
amended version of the statute included such as a provision.
." The 1917 statute was not superseded by the 1963 amended version of
the joint bank account statute with respect to the bank's liability when the
owners of accounts in two names are still living. However, the scope of the
protection was changed. In one sense the 1917 statute afforded more limited
protection; in another it gave a broader protection. Literally, at least, it
only applied to accounts in two names, whereas the more recent statute ap-
plies to accounts in the names of two or more persons. But for the bank to
be protected no particular agreement between the parties was necessary,
whereas the recent legislation requires a written agreement signed by the
parties expressly providing for survivorship.
As to bank protection when one of the parties dies, the 1917 statute
allowed the bank to pay out funds to the other party. However, it appears to
have been superseded to the extent that, if an account comes within the
terms of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (1966), the bank must pay the decedent's
equal share to the legal representative of the estate. But it would appear
that if an account in two names was not within the scope of the latter statute,
the bank could still pay out the funds to the survivor.
" In Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961), the court
stated that unless it could be shown otherwise the parties would be deemed
to own the account equally. The agreement stated the deposit was "for the
use and benefit of ... both." Id. at 153, 120 S.E.2d at 577. However, many
of the agreements establishing survivorship accounts now state that the
parties are co-owners of the funds regardless of whose are deposited. Such
a provision is included in the sample agreement in both the 1959 statute and
the 1963 amended version of the statute. This might lead the court con-
clusively to presume equal ownership while the parties are living.
For a discussion of inter vivos rights in joint bank accounts in general
and a survey of case law on the topic, see Comment, The Donee's itter Vivos
Interests, 60 MicH. L. Rv. 972 (1962).
" Also accounts opened under the statute were subject to the provisions of
law applicable to transfers in fraud of creditors.
"Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).
"Ch. 404 [1959] N.C. Sess L. (amended 1963).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (1966).
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vided that the survivor became the sole owner of the unwithdrawn
deposit, but the more important question was, what were the rights
of creditors? At common law the survivor was entitled to the funds
free from the claims of creditors.2" However, the 1959 statute,27
which was only applicable to husband and wife accounts, modified
the common law and provided that the entire account was sub-
ject to the claims of creditors. Accounts owned by parties not
husband and wife remained exempt from the debts of the deceased.
This inconsistency led to the amendment of the statute in 1963,2"
which brings all deposit accounts within its purview29 and makes
such accounts subject to the claims of creditors only to the extent of
the decedent's equal share."0 To make certain that the funds will
be available for payment of creditors, the 1963 amendment pro-
vides for the banking institution to pay the decedent's equal share
to the legal representative of the deceased and the remainder to the
surviving joint tenant.S The legal representative is not to pay the
claims of creditors from the decedent's share until all other personal
assets of the estate are exhausted."2
Although the 1963 amended version of the statute is generally
clear, with respect to the rights of creditors and whom may open ac-
counts, two important questions remain unanswered. First, does
the statute apply retrospectively? Second, if the statute is to apply
prospectively, does the date of the contract determine the law ap-
plicable, or does the deposit of the particular funds control?
The author of the bill assumed it was to operate retroactively,3 3
but the North Carolina Attorney General ruled that the 1963
" Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
Ch. 404 [1959] N.C. Sess. L. (amended 1963).
28 One authority recommended that the 1959 statute be amended to con-
form with the original drafting; i.e., exempt accounts from the claims of
creditors, or be entirely repealed. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLnrA FAmILY LAW§ 126 n.72 (3d ed. 1963).
The 1963 amendment improved the status of the husband and wife ac-
count, in that no more than one-half is subject to the debts of the deceased.
However, the statute was detrimental to the interests of parties not husband
and wife since it superseded the common law as set out in Wilson County v.
Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960), and made the decedent's
proportionate share subject to the claims of creditors.20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(a) (1966).
30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (3) (1966).
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (4) (1966).
33 Id.
" Interview with B. T. Jones, in Forest City, North Carolina, Sep-
tember 7, 1967.
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amended version of the statute applies only prospectively.84 As a
result of this ruling, the question of whether the contract or deposit
date is controlling takes on greater significance when one party dies.
If the contract date is controlling, husband and wife accounts estab-
lished prior to 1959 and accounts established by parties not husband
and wife prior to 1963 are subject to the common law and therefore
exempt from the claims of creditors of a deceased party. Husband
and wife accounts established between 1959 and 1963 do not enjoy
this favored position since they remain subject to the claims of
creditors in their entirety. It would be advisable for the owners of
these latter accounts to withdraw their funds and establish new ac-
counts so that only one-half the account will be subject to the claims
of creditors, since the present statute would govern their accounts.
Of course, all joint accounts established after 1963, whether or not
they are husband and wife accounts are subject to the claims of
creditors to the extent of the decedent's proportionate share.
If the date of each deposit is considered determinative of ap-
plicable law, the results upon the death of one party will be interest-
ing. A husband and wife account established prior to 1959 will be
treated as follows: funds deposited prior to 1959 will be exempt
from the claims of creditors; funds deposited between 1959 and
1963 will be subject in their entirety to such claims; and one-half the
funds deposited after 1963 will be subject to the debts of the de-
ceased. As to accounts opened by parties not husband and wife any-
time prior to 1963, the funds deposited before 1963 will be exempt
from the claims of creditors, but those funds deposited after that
"' Opinion of Attorney General of North Carolina to Hon. E .W. Tanner,
Clerk of Rutherford Superior Court, dated 18 February 1964. This inter-
pretation was based on two subsections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (1966).
Subsection (a) provides that "a deposit account may be established," and
subsection (d) states that the statute is not to be deemed exclusive with de-
posit accounts not conforming to the statute being governed by other ap-
plicable provisions of the law.
A retroactive application of the statute would raise the constitutional
problems of impairment of the obligation of contract and of taking of property
without due process of law. The court would probably hold the statute to be
prospective, relying on the canon of construction to avoid the constitutional
issue. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
If the statute were construed to be prospective only in application, an-
other question raised is whether a joint account with the right of survivor-
ship could still be established under the common law, i.e., providing for the
account to be exempt from the claims of creditors. Through use of the two
provisions of the statute mentioned above, it appears a plausible argument
exists in favor of this interpretation.
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time will be subject to the decedent's debts to the extent of his pro-
portionate share. Determining the total amount subject to the claims
of creditors would not be difficult if the depositors made no with-
drawals prior to death. But if withdrawals were made, the char-
acter of the remaining funds would have to be determined. Such
funds may be exempt, partially subject or fully subject to the claims
of creditors. 5
In conclusion, the 1963 amended version of the statute is basically
a comprehensive codification of the common law of joint bank ac-
counts with the right of survivorship in North Carolina. Subjecting
accounts to the claims of creditors to the extent of the decedent's
proportionate share is the only provision affecting the rights of the
parties which is inconsistent with the case law. To assist in the ad-
ministration of this fund and to protect the creditor's rights upon
the death of one of the parties, the statute includes a method of dis-
bursement. Although generally explicit in its terms, the statute
should be clarified as to whether it is to be applicable retroactively
or prospectively, and also as to whether the contract date of the ac-
count or the deposit date of the particular funds determines the
rights of creditors upon the death of one of the parties.
WILLIAm H. LEWIs, JR.
Taxation-Deduction of Meals as a Business Travel ]Expense
The United States Supreme Court recently held in United States
v. Correll1 that a wholesale grocery salesman could not deduct the
costs of breakfasts and lunches he ate while traveling in his terri-
tory because he was not required to stop for sleep or rest. Mr. Cor-
rell lived outside his territory but was required by his employer to be
in the district at the start of the working day and to eat breakfast
and lunch at the restaurants of his customers.2 The Corrells filed a
joint income tax return3 and claimed the expense of these meals as
a business deduction under section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal
" The court would have to adopt a formula to determine this: e.g., the
first funds in were the first funds out or the last funds in were the first
funds out.
-36 U.S.L.W. 4055 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).
Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
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Revenue Code.4 They paid the deficiency asserted by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue and sued in the district court for a re-
fund. The jury returned a verdict for the taxpayer and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.5
The Commissioner contended that the cost of such meals was a
personal living expense and not deductible.' He took the position
that for a business trip to be "away from home" so as to qualify
for a deduction for the cost of meals, the trip must be of such a
duration as to require "sleep or rest" before returning home. The
Supreme Court accepted his interpretation."
The Commissioner at one time insisted that the cost of transpor-
tation on business trips was not deductible unless the trip was over-
night, but he found little support in the courts for this position."
In the 1954 Code'0 Congress specifically rejected this idea and made
these expenses deductible though the trip was not overnight.' In
'It appears that the instant case arose under § 162(a) (2) of the 1954
Code before it was amended in 1962. At that time the statute read as follows:
(a) In GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on a trade or business, including-
(2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals
and lodging) while away from home in pursuit of a trade or busi-
ness ....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 162(a) (2), 68A Stat. 46. The amendment,
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 4(b), 76 Stat. 976, has no offect
on the issue before the court.
'Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
6 "[N]o deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family ex-
penses." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
'This has often been referred to as the "overnight" rule, but it is more
accurately called the "substantial sleep or rest" rule. William A. Bagley, 46
T.C. 176, 182 (1966). While Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cumt. BULL. 87 sup-
posedly disallows any deduction unless the taxpayer is "away froil home
overnight" it does not claim to supersede Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum.
BuLL. 75, which defines overnight as "a trip on which the taxpayer's duties
require him to obtain necessary sleep away from his home..., [T]he em-
ployee need not be away from his home terminal for entire 24 hour day or
throughout the hours from dusk until dawn." Despite the existence of this
ruling the Commissioner in Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.
1961), contended that a taxpayer who was away for 16-18 hours each trip
and rented a room for rest during his layover could not deduct the costs
of meals and lodging. See also Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. BUILL. 34;
I.T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 64.
'United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).
'E.g., Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Joseph
M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949).
o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2) (C).
" At present, business transportation expenses can be deducted by an
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1960 the Treasury declared it would not litigate any pending dis-
putes of this nature under the 1939 Code. 2 The "overnight" rule
found more support from the judiciary when it was applied to the
deductibility of meals. The acceptance of the rule in the courts of
appeal was limited,"3 but the Tax Court followed it until 1966"4
when it abandoned the rule. 5 On appeal, however, the First Circuit
reversed and remanded the case.'" This decision created a conflict
between the circuits and the Supreme Court granted certiorari"
in order to resolve the conflict.'
It appears that the primary reason the Supreme Court accepted
the "substantial sleep or rest" rule was to avoid the costly and in-
definite case-by-case determination of what business travel is suffi-
cient to be classified as "away from home" and therefore deductible.' 9
The simplicity and certainty of this approach is its most appealing
aspect.20 Those courts which have rejected the rule have not been
able to offer any substitute which has this quality of clarity; what
employee in arriving at adjusted gross income only if they are reimbursed
by the employer or if they are incurred while he was away from home
overnight....
For this reason ... [the] bill permit[s] employees to deduct business
transportation expenses in arriving at adjusted gross income .... The
business transportation expenses which are deductible ... include only
expenses for actual travel....
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954). See also S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954).
" Rev. Rul. 60-147, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 682 (it was specified that the
acceptance of the Winn decision, note 9 supra, did not affect the position of
the Commissioner that meals and lodging were not deductible unless the trip
was overnight).
"- United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); Hanson v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Patterson, 286
F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961); Ahrens v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.
Ill. 1967). In Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. BuL., 34, the Internal Revenue
Service stated it would follow the decision in the Williams case, supra, and
modified the "overnight" rule to the "substantial sleep or rest" rule.
"See, e.g., Jerome Mortrud, 44 T.C. 208 (1965); Al J. Smith, 33 T.C.
861 (1960); Sam J. Herrin, 28 T.C. 1303 (1957).
" William A. Bagley, 46 T.C. 176 (1966).
"0 Commisioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
" United States v. Correll, 388 U.S. 905 (1967).
"United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).
20 Id. at 4056.
"0In William A. Bagley, 46 T.C. 176, 182 (1966) the court said that
the rule provided simplicity and certainty but added that "administrative
workability [must] yield to logic, reason and justice." However, the First
circuit reversed the Tax Court stating that "fairness and administrative
certainty are more important than logic." Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d
204, 207 (1st Cir. 1967).
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they have presented is, in reality, the case-by-case approach." Even
with such a definite rule there is a possibility of future litigation
over whether the "sleep or rest" on which the deduction must now
depend is reasonably necessary.22
The basic fairness of the rule was also noted by the Supreme
Court. The inequality of a rule that would grant a deduction for
the cost of meals to a man who begins and ends his work day at
home, like any office worker or laborer, merely because he traveled
in his occupation troubled the Court. 3 The cost of the noon meal,
for a worker not on travel status, is a personal living expense and
not deductible. 4 The Court reasoned that the distance traveled should
have no relation to the deductibility of the meal. 5 However, the
same logic holds true when applied to the rule adopted by the court.
Does the addition of the time element make the meal any more de-
ductible? Why should it matter for tax purposes whether the tax-
payer eats the evening meal, rents a room and leaves for home early
the next morning, or eats the evening meal and, instead of renting a
room for the night, begins his trip home at a late hour? In most of
the litigation in this area the taxpayers have either worked long hours
or arrived home late at night.2 Strict adherence by the Treasury to
the "sleep or rest" rule may occasionally influence a taxpayer in
such a case to stay overnight so that he may deduct the cost of three
meals (lunch, dinner, and breakfast) as well as his lodging.
The Court was also apparently impressed by the Commissioner's
21 See cases cited notes 13, 15 supra.22Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 34; the Treasury quotes from the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.
1961) that the correct rule is: "If the nature of the taxpayer's employment
is such that when away from home, during released time, it is reasonable for
him to need and to obtain sleep or rest.., his expenditures ... for the pur-
pose of obtaining sleep or rest are deductible traveling expenses under sec-
tion 162(a) (2) of the 1954 Code."
"United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4056 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).
-' Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Fred Marion
Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261 (1950); Rev. Rul. 56-508, 1956-2 Cult. BuLL. 126,
128; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
2r United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4056. However, the dissent
points out that the deduction, according to the statute, depends only on geog-
raphy and makes no reference to any time element. Id. at 4057.
"'In the instant case the taxpayer was on the road 13 hours, from 4:30
a.m. until 5:30 p.m. In Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967),
the taxpayer would usually arrive home around 10:00 p.m. In Williams
v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961) the taxpayer averaged 16-18
hours for each trip.
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claim of Congressional approval of his interpretation of what is
meant by "away from home." 7 The Commissioner has contended
that Congress endorsed his regulations in 1954 when it enacted
section 162 (a) (2) substantially unchanged from the 1939 Code.2
This is based on the fact that the Committee Reports29 made ref-
erence to the "overnight" rule in recommending the amendment of
what is now section 62(2) (C) of the 1954 Code." In William A.
Bagley3' the Tax Court rejected this argument. The fact that Con-
gress dropped the "overnight" rule as a requisite to the deduction of
transportation expenses, without any evidence that it knew of the
application of the rule to the deductibility of meals, could be inter-
preted as evidence of Congressional disfavor of the "overnight"
rule. The Court pays lip service at least to the suggestion that the
words "meals and lodging" were intended to be a unit because they
appear in the statute82 without being separated by a comma and
therefore meals, to be deductible, must be accompanied by lodging.
This argument was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in Hanson38 where
the court pointed out that section 62(2) (B), which makes specific
reference to section 162, reads "travel, meals, and lodging," the
comma being intended to denote separability of the expenses.
34
The final reason given by the Court is the delegation by Con-
gress to the Commissioner of the power to make necessary rules and
regulations." It is the duty of the judiciary to insure that he does
not exceed this authority. The majority of the Court is of the
opinion that the regulation has not been shown to have exceeded this
" United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4057 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).
"Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 87; what is now § 162(a) (2)
of the 1954 Code, note 4 supra, is substantially the same as INT. REV. CODE OF
1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(1), 53 Stat. 12.
. See note 11 supra.
oFor purposes of this subtitle, the term 'adjusted gross income' means, in
the case of an individual, gross income minus the following deductions:
(2) TRADE AND BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS OF EMPLOYEES-
(C) TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES-The deductions allowed by part
VI (sec. 161 and following) which consist of expenses of trans-
portation paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with the
performance by him of services as an employee.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2) (C).
"46 T.C. 176, 180 (1966).
"See note 4 supra.
"298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 397.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805 (a).
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authority and usurped the legislative function of the Congress."
The three dissenting justices are of the opinion that the regulation
has been shown to be an invalid interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage. 37
STEPHEN E. CULBRETH
Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "Locality" Rule
In Pederson v. Dumouchel,1 plaintiff brought a malpractice action
against a physician, dentist, and hospital to recover for brain dam-
age allegedly sustained as a result of an operation.2 He had suffered
a broken jaw and was placed under the care of Dr. Dumouchel,
who associated a dentist to reduce the fracture. The operation was
performed between 10:20 a.m. and noon the following day. The
dentist had no working knowledge of the use of a general anesthetic,
which was administered by a hospital nurse. No medical doctor
was present during the operation; it was Dr. Dumouchel's after-
noon off and he had left the hospital before the operation com-
menced. Plaintiff suffered convulsive seizures in the recovery room.
About 1:30 p.m. another doctor was located who suspected brain
damage, consulted a neurosurgeon in Seattle, 110 miles away, and
arranged to have plaintiff taken there. He remained unconscious
for a month. Expert testimony supported the finding that plaintiff
suffered severe brain damage caused by the administration of the
anesthetic. Dr. Dumouchel was charged with negligently failing to
assume the responsibility for the patient's medical care while in
surgery. The trial judge instructed the jury that the standard of
care to be applied was "the learning, skill, care, and diligence ordi-
" United States v. Correll, 36 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4057 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1967).3
7 Id.
1 Wash. 2d - , 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
'The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the standard of care
applied to physicians and surgeons. Generally, the standard for dentists is
the same as that applied to doctors.
Much that is said herein about the locality rule is applicable to hospitals
as well as physicians. However, hospital liability for negligence necessarily
involves additional factors such as administrative supervision, ANNOT., 14
A.L.R.3d 873 (1967), agency principles when plaintiff seeks to establish
hospital liability for the negligence of a physician, ANNOT., 69 A.L.R.2d
305 (1960) and the physical facilities of the hospital. See 43 N.C.L. REv.
469 (1965). The Pederson court held that plaintiff's case against the hospital
was sufficient to go to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See
ANNOT., 173 A.L.R. 535 (1948); ANNOT., 9 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1966).
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narily possessed and practiced by others in the same profession...
in the same or in similar localities . . . ."- In holding this instruc-
tion to be reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court took the
position that the degree of care required is that of an average com-
petent practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances, and
that local practice within geographic proximity is only one factor to
be considered. The court set forth the following rule:
A qualified medical . . . practitioner should be subject to
liability, in an action for negligence, if he fails to exercise that
degree of care and skill which is expected of the average prac-
titioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or
similar circumstances. This standard of care is that established
in an area coextensive with the medical and professional means
available in those centers that are readily accessible for appro-
priate treatment of the patient.4
Although the opinion is somewhat ambiguous, it appears that
this court has discarded the "locality" rule and has set forth a stan-
dard of care based on the conduct of a reasonable practitioner acting
under the same or similar circumstances. If so, the court has taken
a major step in conforming the law of malpractice to the conditions
of medical practice as they exist today.
The courts have long encountered difficulty in stating a general
rule by which to measure the standard of care for physicians and
surgeons. Generally, the physician is required to possess and exer-
cise that degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed and exer-
cised by physicians under similar circumstances.5 The early cases
imposed a narrow qualification on the standard by requiring that it
be determined by reference to the "same" locality or community in
which the defendant-doctor practices.' The locality rule is based
on the premise that a doctor in a small community does not have the
same opportunities and resources as do urban doctors to keep
abreast of developments in his profession, and therefore can not
'- Wash. 2d - , , 431 P.2d 973, 976 (1967).
Id. at - , 431 P.2d at 978.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
'E.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872). The cases are collected
in McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 569 (1959).
Many courts impose various combinations of additional qualifications on
the standard of care such as an "average" physician "in good standing"
engaged in "the same general line of practice." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 299A (1963).
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be held to the same standard. Since laymen are generally considered
unqualified to pass judgment on medical questions, courts consis-
tently hold that there can be no finding of negligence without the aid
of expert testimony.7 It follows that the competence of an expert to
testify depends upon his familiarity with the customary practice in
the locality. This narrow limitation, coupled with the reluctance
of any doctor in the community to testify against another,8 makes it
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to make out a malpractice case in
jurisdictions applying the "same" locality rule.
Most courts have realized that the "same" locality is too narrow,
and have extended the rule to include "same or similar" localities.0
This liberalization makes it somewhat easier for a plaintiff to obtain
experts willing to testify favorably, but it does not alleviate the pos-
sibility that a few local doctors can set a standard below that re-
quired by law. A few courts operating under a "similar" localities
rule have not been content to determine similarity on the basis of
population, and have attempted to compare similar "medical locali-
ties."' 0 Recent decisions indicate that the courts are becoming
much more liberal in finding similarity," admitting expert testi-
mony and taking judicial notice that two localities are similar12 or
Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Graham v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Berardi v.
Menicks, 340 Mass. 396, 164 N.E.2d 544 (1960); Miller v. Raaen, 273
Minn. 109, 139 N.W.2d 877 (1966); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88
S.E.2d 762 (1955); Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W.Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352(1965). Expert testimony is not required, however, if the negligence is so
grossly apparent or treatment of such common occurrence that a layman
would be able to appraise it. Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d
147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140
N.W.2d 139 (1966); Hammer v. Rosen, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 165 N.E.2d 756
(1960).
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 167 (3d ed. 1964); Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice and the Relluctant Expert, 16 CATr. U.L. REv. 158 (1966).
Engle v. Clarke, 346 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961); Small v. Howard, 128
Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880); Bradshaw v. Blaine, 1 Mich. App. 50,
134 N.W.2d 386 (1965) ; Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1, 76 S.E.2d 461 (1953);
Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
10 Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Sampson v.
Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavellaro v. Sharpe 84
R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956).11Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (a
Philadelphia surgeon permitted to testify in Baltimore); Riley v. Layton,
329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964) (California physician familiar with small-
town practice qualified to testify in Utah town); Couch v. Hutchison, 135
So. 2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961) (Florida surgeon allowed to testify on teachings
of a Philadelphia medical school).
12 Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla. App. 1962).
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that the witness was familiar with general practice in the com-
munity.13
In furtherence of the tendency to liberalize the area qualification
of the standard, the courts have devised additional ways to minimize
or circumvent the effect of the locality rule. First, the conduct of a
general practitioner is tested by (1) the degree of skill and knowl-
edge possessed by the other physicians in the same or similar locality,
and (2) the degree of care and diligence exercised by those physi-
cians in applying their skill. 4 Malpractice liability may result either
through lack of skill and knowledge or neglect to apply it, if pos-
sessed.' 5 In Williams v. Chamberlain,16 a physician was charged only
with failure to exercise the necessary "care." The Missouri Supreme
Court, by strong dictum, stated that the original reasons for the
locality rule pertain to the inability of a rural physician to possess
the skill and knowledge of urban physicians; that where a physician
is charged only with failure to exercise due "care," the locality
should make no difference and there should be a national standard.
While the distinction is perhaps theoretically sound, as a practical
matter it may not mean very much. Can the courts really tell
whether a physician's conduct was a failure to exercise "care" or a
failure to possess knowledge to exercise it?
Second, as the courts learn more about medical practices, they
are beginning to formulate with specificity what is required of the
reasonable physician in certain circumstances, rather than de-
pending upon experts to formulate it. For example, once the
doctor-patient relationship is established, a doctor has a duty to ex-
amine the patient,' 7 not to abandon the patient until the relation-
ship terminates,' 8 to disclose any abnormal risks in the treatment,' 9
1 1Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
1 4D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAmS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.04 (1966).
"= DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So. 2d 762 (1964); New-
port v. Hyde, 244 Miss. 870, 147 So. 2d 113 (1962); Williams v. Chamber-
lain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958); Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51
A.2d 632 (1947).
" 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958).
" E.g., Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala. 534, 147 So. 608 (1933) ; Wheatley
v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 102 N.W.2d 343 (1960).
18E.g., Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d 238 (1962); O'Neil v.
Montefiore Hospital, 11 A.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960); see ANNOT.,
57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958).
"Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C.
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to instruct patients how to carry out treatment (especially drugs),20
and to follow the progress of treatment.2 If the facts of a particular
case reveal a clear breach of such a duty, the court may permit a
jury to find negligence without the aid of expert testimony,22 the
result being to minimize or remove the effect of the locality rule.
Third, the court may simply disregard the locality rule. In
Koury v. Folio, 23 a Greensboro, North Carolina physician was
charged with prescribing an injection of a drug containing strepto-
mycin for plaintiff's nine-month old baby for treatment of a cold
and bronchitis; afterward the child became deaf. The label on the
drug container stated "Not for Pediatric Use," accompanied by a
warning against use for children. The plaintiff's expert witness
testified that deafness was a known hazard, and, in effect, that such
use was dangerous. The opinion does not reveal whether or not the
expert was familiar with the practice in Greensboro. The defendant
testified that other pediatricians in Greensboro were then using the
drug in like dosages for children as young as nine months of age.
Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient
to justify a finding by the jury that the defendant was negligent.
By disregarding the locality rule, it appears that the court found
plaintiff's evidence sufficient to prove that defendant's conduct sub-
jected the child to an unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding
the fact that such conduct was customary in Greensboro.
Most writers generally agree that today the locality of practice
is of diminishing importance.24 As early as 1916, in Viita v. Flein-
nuing,25 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the concept that the
153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) ; Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762
(1955).2
* E.g., Beck v. The German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696, 43 N.W. 617 (1889);
McKenzie v. Siegel, 261 Minn. 299, 112 N.W.2d 353 (1961).1 Revels v. Pohle, 101 Ariz. 208, 418 P.2d 364 (1966); Sinz v. Owens,
33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Willard v. Hutson, 234 Or. 148, 378
P.2d 966 (1963).
"
2 Revels v. Pohle, 101 Ariz. 208, 418 P.2d 364 (1966). "[L]aymen
can say that in all cases where there are continual complaints of pain from a
patient over a substantial period of time, that it is a departure from standard
medical practice for the doctor to fail to examine the patient in any man-
ner." Id. at - , 418 P.2d at 367. Capps v. Valk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d
238 (1962); Engle v. Clarke, 346 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961).23272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
24 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.06 (1966); McCoID, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964);
14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962).
2' 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
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locality is an overall qualification of the standard. That court stated,
in effect, that the standard of care should be expressed in terms of
"like circumstances," and the locality should be considered only as
one of the circumstances. Since 1916, this development has gained
judicial support,28 some of which has been by word rather than by
deed.17 If this rule is applied as stated, an expert otherwise qualified
would not be required to possess personal knowledge of the stan-
dards in the same or in a similar locality. He would be permitted to
testify to standards of care possessed by the profession generally,
and if any evidence concerning local practice is before the court, the
jury could consider it in determining the weight to be given the
expert's testimony. This rule greatly increases a plaintiff's ability to
find favorable expert witnesses as well as easing his overall burden
of proof. In Murphy v. Little,2" the Georgia Supreme Court applied
this concept of a national standard of care operating under a statute
which requires a physician or surgeon to exercise a reasonable de-
gree of care and skill.
The compelling interpretation of the Pederson case is that the
court reached the same result as the Murphy case without the aid of
a statute, and thus effectively discarded the locality rule.2" Super-
ficially, the case is subject to the criticism that by its definition of
" Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941);
McGulpin v. Bessemer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950) ; Carbonne v.
Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); H-odgson v. Bigelow, 335
Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939).
- Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949). The California
Supreme Court said "The essential factor is knowledge of similarity of
conditions; geographical proximity is only one factor to be considered." Id.
at 756, 205 P.2d at 7. However, when plaintiff argued that the area for
determination of the standard should be the San Joaquin Valley, containing
two cities of over 50,000 people and smaller towns including the community
of defendant-doctor's practice, the court balked, saying that plaintiff "seeks
to advance this development beyond permissible bounds." Id. at 755,
205 P.2d at 6.
"' 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965).
" In a more recent Washington case, Versteeg v. Mowery, - Wash. 2d
-, 435, P.2d 540 (1967), the Supreme Court cited Pederson with ap-
proval. At first blush, the language of the court seems to indicate that the court
has retained the locality rule. However, the plaintiff totally failed to estab-
lish any standard of care at all. The expert testimony merely offered evi-
dence that each surgeon uses different surgical methods when inserting a
plastic implant into female breasts. The court said that a jury is not capable
of choosing between conflicting standards of the various expert witnesses.
"[T]he medical standard or the minimal standard may be the same here that
it is in Beverly Hills or New York or some place else, but nobody has said
so." 435 P.2d at 543-44.
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geographic proximity 30 it adds confusion to an already confused
area of the law. Such phrases as "coextensive with the means avail-
able," and "readily accessible" mean very little in themselves with-
out further judicial interpretation. The real significance of the
case, however, lies in what the court intended by defining geographic
proximity in this manner. One possible interpretation is that the
court has retained a "similar" locality qualification on the standard,
and has defined a "medical locality" making the "similar locality"
a broader concept. This would be entirely inconsistent with the
court's statement that the standard of care is to be expressed in terms
of "the same or similar circumstances," and that locality is to be
only one of the circumstances. It seems probable, upon analysis of
the entire opinion, that the court did not intend to retain any con-
cept of geographic qualification, especially since it stated that it is
no longer proper "to limit the definition of the standard of care...
to the practice or custom of . . .a geographical area."3 1 The more
tenable interpretation is that the standard of care is that required
of a reasonable physician acting under the same or similar circum-
stances. The geographic proximity remains important, but only to
the extent that it is necessary to determine what the reasonable doc-
tor would have done in the same or similar situation. An expert,
witness, unfamiliar with customary practice and the local level of
knowledge and skill, would be competent to give his opinion of what
is required of the profession generally. If the local practice differs
from the expert testimony from the plaintiff's side, then it rests with
defendant's counsel to bring such evidence before the court. Then,
under proper instruction, it is the province of the jury to determine
what is required of the average physician under these circumstances.
This is a most welcome decision. Most courts are operating un-
der standards of care encumbered with rigid qualifications to the
point that it is often difficult to discern that the malpractice action is
grounded in negligence. The Pederson court recognized that the
controlling question should be whether or not the conduct of the
physician subjects the patient to an unreasonable risk of harm, and
not what is the practice in the particular locality. It becomes ever
more apparent that the original reasons employed to justify the lo-
30 Note 4, supra, and accompanying text.
" Pederson v. Dumouchel, - Wash. 2d - -, 431 P.2d 973, 978
(1967).
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cality rule no longer exist.32 In Pederson the court reasoned "Now
there is no lack of opportunity for a physician or surgeon to keep
abreast of the advances in his profession .... "3 The standards re-
quired by state medical licensing boards, the comprehensive coverage
of medical journals, the "detail men" of drug companies, and post
graduate courses serve to keep physicians abreast of national stan-
dards. 4 It is not contended that the facilities in smaller communities
are now equal to those in larger towns and cities, nor that the ability
and methods of treatment are everywhere the same. It is contended,
however, that the older barriers no longer exist that would prevent
any competent physician from knowing the extent of his ability
and the capabilities of his facilities. There is nothing to prevent the
doctor from knowing what skills and facilities are readily accessible
for the proper treatment of the patient. "Increasingly realistic
judges . . . will acknowledge that the legal rule ceases when the
reasons for it cease."1
3 5
HAROLD N. BYNUM
Wills-Ademption by Trustee of Incompetent Testator in
North Carolina-Adoption of the Intent Rule
In Grant v. Banks' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the sale by a trustee of property specifically devised by his ward
prior to incapacitation did not adeem the devise and that proceeds
from the sale still remaining in the estate were recoverable under
"In 1940, in Tevdt v. Haugen. 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188
(1940), the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
"The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as they
exist, and not what they have been in the past or may be in the future.
Today, with rapid methods of transportation and easy means of com-
munication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is
not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular vil-
lage where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned,
the borders of the locality or community have, in effect, been extended so
as to include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment
may be had which the local physician, because of his limited facilities or
training is unable to give."
" Pederson v. Dumouchel, - Wash. 2d , , 431 P.2d 973, 977
(1967).
'Id. at - , 431 P.2d at 977.
" D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.06 (1966).
1270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
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the doctrine of equitable conversion.' The issue of ademption by
act of a trustee for an incompetent testator was one of first impres-
sion in North Carolina. Prior North Carolina ademption cases are
based on the acts of testator 4 or events happening during the life of
testator" while he retained testamentary capacity.6
In this case the testatrix had executed a will in 1951 providing
for the disposition of her personal property and for the sale of her
homeplace, the proceeds of which were to be distributed to her
nephews and nieces or their heirs. The will further provided that,
subject to the right of the estate to control and possession for two
years, a store and lot owned by testatrix was to go to the Methodist
Orphanage. In 1957 testatrix was struck and seriously injured by
an automobile and required constant medical and custodial care until
her death in 1964. She was adjudged mentally incompetent and a
trustee was appointed. With court approval the homeplace and lot
were sold to provide funds to support the incompetent. Upon de-
pletion of these and other cash reserves permission was obtained to
sell the store and lot devised to the Methodist Orphanage. Of the
90,000 dollars received from the sale of the store and lot, between
40,000 dollars and 50,000 dollars remained in the estate at the time
of testatrix's death. The issue raised in the suit was whether the
specific devise of the store and lot was adeemed by the trustee's sale
or if the remaining proceeds of the sale should go to the orphanage.
The ability of a trustee to adeem property specifically devised by
his ward is the subject of sharp conflict among American courts.
This conflict is largely due to the fact -that some courts have ap-
plied the rule that the intention of the testator must control, so
that ordinarily there would be no ademption, while others take
the view ... that the true test is whether or not the thing spe-
2 d. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95. "Conversion is the fictional change of realty
into personalty or of personalty into realty for equitable purposes." Scott v.
Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 250, 69 S.E.2d 557, 562 (1952). Thus the equitable
conversion doctrine applied here is that the sale proceeds are impressed with
the characteristics of the specific devise so that they might pass to the
specific devisees under the will.
' There are several types of ademption possible in the law of wills, i.e.,
ademption by gift during testator's life, ademption by extinguishment, etc.
See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1172 (1957); 57 Am. JUR. Wills §§ 1579, 1580
(1948). This note, however, is concerned only with ademption by extinc-
tion of the subject matter.
"E.g., Tyer v. Meadows, 215 N.C. 733, 3 S.E.2d 264 (1939).6E.g., Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306 (1908).270 N.C. at 481, 155 S.E.2d at 93.
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cifically bequeathed remains in specie at the time of testator's
death ... .7*
The latter view, known as the English or specie test, is the minority
rule.' The minority jurisdictions reason that if the specific devise
is not in the testator's estate at the time of death, the courts have no
power absent specific statutory direction to change the residuary
estate into the specific devise. The majority follow the view that no
ademption occurs when the trustee of an incompetent testator sells
the property devised because of the inability of the testator to ex-
press his testamentary intent other than as expressed in the will."
Even the majority, however, generally agree that there is an ademp-
tion pro tanto of the proceeds used in the ward's maintenance."
In adopting the majority rule the supreme court relied on
Brown v. Cowper."2 The court there, in construing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-32, stated: "The general rule is that, where the real estate of a
lunatic is sold under a statute, or by order of court, the proceeds of
sale remain realty for the purpose of devolution on his death intes-
tate while still a lunatic."' 8 Despite the fact that the above case
applied to an intestate lunatic, the court could "see no reason why
... this rule should not apply to an incompetent testator."'14 Reason-
ing further the court stated:
Trustee and ward is a trust relation in which the trustee acts for
the ward, whom the law regards as incapable of managing his
own affairs. The legal title to the property is in the ward, the
trustee being merely the custodian, manager, or conservator of
the ward's estate. In his limited Capacity .. .the trustee has no
power to change the will of his ward by merely commingling
assets in his hands. To so hold would reach the preposterous
157 AM. JUR. Wills § 1590 (1948).
' E.g., Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 122 N.E.2d 475 (1954). See
96 C.J.S. Wills § 1174 (1957); Arnot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957).
o i Re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931), changed by
statute, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 1399 (1933); accord, Jones v.
Green, (1868) L.R. 5 Ch. 555.
20N. WIGGINS, NORTii CAROLINA WILLs § 143 (1964); 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.13. (1952).
" Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957); Contra, It Re Mason's Estate, 42
Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965).
12 247 N.C. 1, 100 .S.E.2d 305 (1957). In this case the guardian of a
lunatic had sold his ward's interest in land with court approval. Upon his
death the heirs at law sought to take the personal property as if it were
realty.
" Id. at 9, 100 S.E.2d at 311.
" 270 N.C. at 484, 155 S.E.2d at 95.
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result of allowing a guardian or trustee to rewrite and alter the
provisions of a will so as to destroy the testamentary intent of
testator.15
Although this reasoning is in line with many recent decisions
on this point'6 it does not necessarily follow that this is the most
just or equitable rule.
In adopting the intent test the court stated that a failure to do
so "would reach the preposterous result of allowing a guardian or
trustee ... to destroy the testamentary intent of testator by merely
commingling funds."' 7 In appellant's brief, however, it was noted
that
it is well to remember in this case that the trustee ... elected to
sell and dispose of the homeplace prior to his sale and disposal of
the downtown property. Had he first sold the downtown property,
the homeplace, which brought $17,500 (an amount much less
than that which is now on hand), would have remained intact.18
Thus by choosing the order in which the various pieces of property
were sold the trustee did in fact decide who would take under the
will. It is difficult to understand how this result is any less "pre-
posterous" as regards testatrix's actual intent.
The court in following the majority rule apparently adopted the
major exception to it,19 i.e., that proceeds of the sale used in the
support and maintenance of the ward are adeemed pro tanto. It
should be noted, however, that such pro tanto ademption was un-
avoidable in that no other funds were available to support the testa-
trix. Should a case arise in which the trustee sells property subject
to a specific devise for support of the ward while "generally de-
vised" property remains intact at death, will the court require the
latter property be given to the specific devisees up to the value of the
specific devise because of the inability of the trustee to change testa-
tor's intent ?2 It would seem logical so to hold under the present rule
" Id. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95, 96.
"
0 See, e.g., Forbes v. Burket, 181 So. 2d 682 (Fla. App. 1966); Our
Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 422 P.2d 74 (Idaho 1967); Stake v. Cole, 257
Iowa 594, 133 N.W.2d 714 (1965).
' 270 N.C. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95, 96.
s Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 5, Grant v. Banks, 270 N.C. 473,
155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
- 270 N.C. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95. The court allowed only the recovery
of those funds which were not used in the support of the ward or in costs of
administration.2 At least one court has so done. In It Re Mason's Estate, 62 Cal. 2d
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since the court, by denying the trustee the power "to destroy the
testamentary intent of testator" implies a fortiori that the testa-
mentary intent will thus be preserved.
In preserving the testamentary intent the court reasoned that
the doctrine of equitable conversion should apply to the incompetent
testate situation as well as the incompetent intestate situation."'
This reasoning seemingly overlooks one important factor-the will
as an expression of testator's intent as to the ultimate disposition of
his entire estate. In the intestate situation the legislature provides
a will for the decedent. The principle underlying the various classi-
fications delineated by descent and distribution statutes is that those
who generally would be the natural objects of a decedent's bounty
take over those who would not." Had the instant case been an in-
testate situation the Methodist Orphanage would have had no
claim.23 Since it is testate, however, the court holds that the
orphanage takes the money remaining in the estate to the exclusion
of the next of kin. In so doing the court places great emphasis on
the fact that the orphanage was to get a specific devise while the
next of kin were intended to take only the residuary estate. Was
this in fact the intention of the testatrix?
Although this is a problem of ademption rather than construction
of wills, it is helpful to refer to the will to determine whether the
result attained under the majority rule is in accord with testatrix's
intentions-the implied purpose of adopting the rule. Generally the
will must be construed as a whole to ascertain the intent of the
testator.2 4 In the present case testatrix bequeathed the store and
213, 397 P.2d 1005, 42 Cal. Reptr. 13 (1965), there was a specific devise of
testator's home to the son of a friend. After incompetency, the guardian bank
sold the home for testator's support, keeping the 21,000 dollars sale proceeds
in a separate account. At death only 556.66 dollars of this money remained.
Other property in the estate valued at 6,808.08 dollars was to go to the
residuary legatees. In holding that there was no ademption pro tanto of the
specific devise, the court stated that "when specifically devised property
has been sold and the proceeds used to pay debts and expenses, the devisee
may have his gift redeemed from the remainder of the estate." 62 Cal. 2d
at 217, 397 P.2d at 1008, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
-1 270 N.C. at 484, 155 S.E.2d at 95.
"See 23 Am. JUR. 2d Descent and Distribution § 10 (1965) ; e.g., Gar-
wols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239 (1930).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -29 (1962).
" E.g., Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 143
S.E.2d 689 (1965); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taliaferro, 246 N.C.
121, 97 S.E.2d 776 (1957) ; Mewborn v. Mewborn, 239 N.C. 284, 79 S.E.2d
398 (1954).
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lot to the orphanage subject to the control and possession of her
estate for two years, the bequest being "made at the request of my
[deceased] husband."25 The will further provided that "the rest and
residue which remains in the hands of my said Executor . . . shall
... be equally divided between [the children of my brothers or their
heirs]"6 Obviously testatrix did not contemplate her future in-
competency at the time she executed the will. Construing the will as
a whole it is extremely doubtful that she intended her nephews and
nieces to be excluded under any circumstances. Even as to the
specific devise she provided that it was to be subject to the right of
the residuary estate to possession for two years. 7 Indeed, by her
very words the testatrix provided for the orphanage at the request
of her deceased husband. Under the intent rule adopted by the
court, however, an entity outside of the family relationship took the
whole of the residuary estate to the exclusion of her family. It was
just such a result which led the New York court to adopt the English
view, saying "an intention to hold... shares of the preferred stock
for the benefit of a stranger, while spending the remainder of his
estate which would naturally go to his children, for doctors, nurses,
and maintenance can hardly be imagined." 2
Perhaps a more equitable rule in situations like the present is the
Scottish rule cited by our court but not followed.2 This rule states
that "no act of a curator bonis can avail to affect the order of his
ward's succession. . . unless it can be shown not only that it was a
proper and necessary act of administration on the part of the curator,
but that it would have been a necessary and unavoidable act on the
part of the ward if sui juris.' '30 Comparing this test with the ma-
jority and minority American doctrines it seems a safe middle
ground in that (1) it does not require ademption every time the char-
acter of the specific devise is changed (minority rule), while (2) it
does not deny ademption every time the change in the devise is
"Record at 13, Grant v. Banks, 270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).26 Id. at 14.
2'Thus, should not the court have allowed as a minimum the right of the
residuary legatees to possession and control of the remaining money for
two years?
"in Re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 160, 177 N.E. 405, 406 (1931),
changed by statute, NEw Yonx CiviLr PRACTIcE ACT, § 1399 (1933).
29 270 N.C. at 482, 155 S.E.2d at 93.
"o Macfarlane's Trustees v. Macfarlane, 47 Scot. L.R. 266, 269, 1 Scots
L.T.R. 40, 42 (1910); accord, Davidson v. Davidson, 39 Scot. L.R. 106, 9
Scot. L.T.R. 253 (1901).
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caused by act of a trustee (majority rule). This rule would not
give the trustee the power "to destroy the testamentary intent of
testator" because it requires not only that the change be a necessary
act on the part of the trustee but that it be an act which the testator
would have made himself if compos mentis. Applying this rule to the
instant case there would be an ademption of the specific devise and
the heirs would take the residuary estate. Since the store and lot
was the only estate asset left at the time of the sale, the testatrix
would have had to sell the property for support had she been sui
juris.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court followed the great
weight of American authority in adopting the intent test it seems
that the rule adopted did not give effect to the intention of testatrix.
The basic fault in both the majority and minority rules in this
country is their failure to give effect to the will as a whole in de-
termining the intent of testator. In light of this failing the Scottish
rule of necessity would ostensibly bring about a more equitable so-
lution.
JAMES R. CARPENTER, JR.
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